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Abstract  
This paper’s field evidence is: (1) many official sectors rapidly forget the damage of the 1982-85 exchange rate liquidity crisis 
and reverted to what caused that crisis, namely a closed economy clean floats perspective; and (2) the 2006-2008/9 exchange 
rate liquidity shock would have been more drastic but for central bank currency swaps.  This evidence is bolstered by a 
laboratory experiment that incorporates more aspects of real world complexity and more different sorts of official and private 
sector agents than are feasible in econometric or algebraic investigations and employs a new central bank cooperation-conflict 
model of exchange rate determination, and is within an umbrella theory of Pope, namely SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge 
Ahead Theory.  SKAT allows for risk effects from stages omitted in normal models, including those from (a) difficulties of 
agents  in  evaluating  alternatives  in  a  complex  environment  in  which  the  assumed  maximization  of  expected  utility  is 
impossible; and (b) preference for safety and reliability is not trivialized. 
Our joint field plus laboratory evidence indicates that official sectors should maintain an international exchange rate oriented 
perspective, or better yet, a single world currency as recommended by Zhou Xiaochuan, head of the People’s Bank of China.  
To avoid rapid forgetting of havoc from isolationist clean floats and the value of stable exchange rates, a new syllabus, as 
under the SKAT umbrella, is fundamental in the education of official sector members in order to furnish them with a coherent 
alternative intellectual framework to current university education that excludes liquidity crises.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Massive unpredicted relative price changes in two currencies is a definition of an exchange rate liquidity 
shock, especially when preceded or accompanied by a massive unpredicted rise in the cost of borrowing 
in either currency. Exchange rate liquidity shocks are devastating to economies.  Since 1970 there have Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  2 
been two world wide exchange rate liquidity shocks: (i) the doubling in value of the USD and world 
interest rates in the early 1980s; and (ii) the steep rise in the USD and interest rate spreads between 2006 
and 2008/9.  Two potential world-wide exchange rate liquidity shocks were averted due to swift action by 
Alan Greenspan and the US Federal Reserve Board, namely those arising from: (iii) Long Term Capital 
Management’s 1998 mispredictions of the liquidity of some bonds, stocks and currencies; and (iv) the 
September 11, 2001 attack on the US which created an abrupt drop in demand for USD.  
This paper investigates which exchange rate regime caused the two actual world-wide exchange rate 
liquidity shocks, and which exchange rate regime averted the other two potential world-wide exchange 
rate liquidity shocks.  It uses a 3-way division of exchange rate regimes: 1) clean floats believed by their 
advocates  to  maintain  equilibrium;  2)  dirty  floats  believed  by  their  advocates  to  speed  return  to 
equilibrium after specific shocks; and 3) managed floats believed by their advocates to stabilize exchange 
rates.  Parts 2 to 4 delineate these three regimes, our failure to discern the equilibrating fundamentals 
assumed by those advocating both the clean and dirty float regimes, and our minimal progress via current 
econometric estimates in understanding of why exchange rates change.  Part 5 describes one reason for 
our having learned so little about equilibrating fundaments, and thus so little about clean floats, and also 
on  whether  a  managed  float  focused  on  stabilizing  the  exchange  rate  is  inferior  to  the  guarantee  of 
invariance in the exchange rate via a currency union or a single world money.  This reason is the omission 
under expected utility theory – and its standard extensions such as prospect theory – of the risk and 
uncertainty  effects  experienced  in  chronological  time.    Parts  6  to  8  introduce  SKAT,  the  Stages  of 
knowledge Ahead Theory to consistently include these effects, and offer a radically different model of 
how exchange rates are set.  Part 9 presents some field data as evidence that clean floats tend to generate 
exchange rate liquidity shocks.  Part 10 describes the obstacles in using either armchair theorising or 
econometric estimates to progress beyond our simple field data evidence.  Parts 11 to 13 detail why a 
laboratory set-up can offer fresh insights, present our experiment, and its results.  Part 14 concludes. 
 
2  CLEAN, DIRTY, MANAGED FLOATS AND EQULIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATES 
The  clean  float  was  originally  promulgated  under  the  belief  that  speculation  is  stabilising  and  that 
exchange rates would be far more stable than under Bretton Woods, Kenen (2002).  The post world war 2 
concept of a clean or freely floating exchange rate is closely connected with Milton Friedman (1953, 
1998).  It stemmed from a closed economy modeling.  It catered for US isolationist desires of not being 
pressured to conform to international pressures that its monetary policy (in funding the Vietnam War 
under President Richard Nixon) was too expansionary.  In Friedman’s version of the clean float, a central 
bank ought focus exclusively on the domestic price level.  In alternative versions that arose in the 1980s 
and continue to be promulgated today, the float was clean provided it focused exclusively on domestic 
goals and ignored exchange rate implications.   
Under dirty and managed floats, a currency’s monetary policy includes the exchange rate as a goal in its 
own right.  Under a dirty float, the official sector attempts to change its exchange rate in the belief that 
this will restore equilibrium. Under a managed float, as the term is used in this paper, the official sector 
uses  exchange  rate  interventions,  central  bank  currency  swaps,  interest  rate  changes,  public 
announcements and fiscal policy in an effort to keep its exchange rate steady. For further details on the 
evolution and applications of clean, dirty and managed floats, see Appendices 1 and 2. Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  3 
The managed float perspective is independent of whether an exchange rate equilibrium is a meaningful or 
an empty and empirically disproven concept.  By contrast both clean and the dirty floats rest on there 
being discernible equilibrium exchange rates.  Under the clean float perspective, every exchange rate is 
equilibrating, provided that the official sector did not deliberately seek to alter the exchange rate.  Under 
the  dirty  float  perspective,  under  the  joint  internal  (employment)  and  external  (current  account) 
equilibrium  concept  of  Meade  (1951),1  the  official  sector  alters  the  exchange  rate  to  rapidly  restore 
equilibrium in the wake of shocks despite sticky wages or prices.  
Thus for both the clean and the dirty float perspectives, economists need to understand the fundamentals 
that determine exchange rates.  To implement dirty floats, economists must in addition be able to predict 
reasonably accurately exchange rates in the short term to medium.  As detailed in Parts 3 and 4 below, 
economists neither understand exchange rates nor can predict exchange rates in the short to medium term 
run.   
 
3  PRACTICAL ECONOMISTS’ UNDERSTANDING AND PREDICTING THE EXCHANGE RATE 
Central bankers, despite their well-endowed research departments, bewail their inability to understand 
embarrassing and undesired changes in their country’s exchange rate, eg Cobham (2002a), Bergo (2006).  
Major  multi-nationals  go  into  receivership  through  exchange  rate  errors  despite  access  to  the  top 
commercial exchange rate experts.  Currency blocs engage in trade wars since unable to implement the 
dirty float regime under which: 
a)  if one currency bloc has above equilibrium wages and prices, then the other currency bloc 
must have below equilibrium wages and prices; and  
b)   below  and  above  equilibria  wages  and  prices  are  objectively  identified  by  means  of  an 
agreed-upon model employed by economists advocating for each currency bloc  
An agreed identification of a) and b) has been rarely struck over the last 50 years. Instead, as documented 
in  Pope  (2008),  the  practice  of  dirty  floats  has  been  systematically  of  a  beggar-thy-neighbour  form, 
Appendix 3.   
Has academic modeling – when removed from the hurley burley of the economists being located in 
central banks, firms or treasuries – had any more success in discerning exchange rate equilibria? 
 
4  ACADEMIC ECONOMISTS’ UNDERSTANDING AND PREDICTING THE EXCHANGE RATE 
4.a Equilibrating fundamentals 
Econometric  models  that  incorporate  equilibrating  fundamentals  fail  after  each  new  unanticipated 
exchange rate crisis.  Each new crisis affords us a new pool of data.  The prior theories fitted the earlier 
quarterly data enough to get statistically significant coefficients, even if not enough to allow firms and 
governments to plan efficiently.  But out of sample, those that are publicly available and checked, fail to 
outperform a random walk unless each data point is stretched from being a quarter in duration to a two 
years  in  duration,  Meese  and  Rogoff  (1983),  Krugman  (1993),  Mussa  (1993),  Pagan  (1993),  Chinn, 
Cheung and Pascual (2005), Alquist and Chinn (2006).  Out of each crisis, we acquire new generation 
theories.  For a nice survey of this evolution, see Dan Friedman (2005).  Out of sample, some in the latest 
generation of publicly available ones do better than a random walk, as for instance, via improvements in 
                                                 
1 We are indebted to Ed Nell on Meade’s seminal place in arguments for official sector interventions to alter exchange rates. Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  4 
measuring money stocks, including that reported in Bissoondeeal, Binner and Elger (2006).  However it 
continues to be the case that those available for public evaluation have a minimal degree of explanatory 
power, Engels et al (2007).   
One that employs fundamentals under standard competitive market assumptions but is not available for 
public  evaluation  uses  Bayesian  priors,  Putnam  and  Quintana  (1993).    It  suggests  an  impressive 
increment over investing in the S&P 500. However no information is provided on this Bayesian prior 
enhanced model’s degree of predictive power concerning individual exchange rates, or even concerning 
the set of exchange rates together used in its portfolio management strategy.   Thus no evidence is 
afforded that its possible increment in exchange rate predictive power puts it anywhere near the level of 
prediction accuracy required to avoid firms going bankrupt.  Firms continue to go bankrupt in their 
hedging  mistakes,  hinting  that  even  this  non-publicly  available  Bayesian  priors  technique  leaves  the 
economic equilibrating fundamentals unsatisfactorily vague.    
Some, eg Pagan deem it fine if exchange rate models have essentially zero explanatory power in under 
two years – on the grounds that fundamentals are about long term factors not short to medium term ones. 
However  firms  need shorter term  predictions to  be reasonably sure of  survival.   Likewise  monetary 
officials need to operate within short horizons, above all in times like the sub-rime crisis of 2007-9. But 
economists  understand  short  term  movements  of  the  exchange  rate  so  minimally  that  official  sector 
econometric models yield predictions deemed inferior to asking the wise their hunch, Pagan (2005).  It is 
thus transparent the exchange rates play no discernible verifiable beneficial equilibrating role within two 
years, and at most a discernible equilibrating role in horizons of up to four years. 
In  addition,  even  within  a  two  to  four  year  range,  the  sub-prime  crisis  hints  at  the  need  for  a  new 
generation of models that have in their set of explanators factors like repayments of funds to US dollar 
denominated  creditors  when  these  face  a  liquidity  crunch.    With  such  explanators  it  would  seem 
implausible that a new generation model could predict the rise in the USD 2006-2008.  But this class of 
explanators lies outside current notions of “fundamentals”, and the need for such explanators hints at the 
weaknesses in the whole neoclassical equilibrating conception of floating exchange rates.  
4.b  Understanding despite prediction inability? 
It can be that economists understand fundamentals in the sense of being able to explain after the fact why 
the  exchange  rate  changed  without  being  able  to  predict  the  changes.    This  will  be  the  case  if  the 
explanators are inherently unpredictable.  Such indeed is plausibly the case, for reasons given in Part 8 
and the presentation of our own central bank cooperation conflict model of exchange rate determination.2  
However even this does not mean that economists or anyone else can after the fact identify when a pair of 
countries is in internal and external equilibrium as per Meadian and neoclassical concepts.  This would 
only occur if analysts can discern equilibrium under the conditions of complex reality as distinct from the 
simple worlds postulated in tractable algebraic models.  Evidence of everyone’s inability to discern such 
real world equilibria is inferable from the systematic biases economists exhibit in doing so, Pope (2008) 
and Appendix 3 below, and from economist’s inability to identify even the game theoretic equilibrium in 
a far more simple set-up than reality, Parts 12 and 13 below.   
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4.c  Market Power  
Many, arguably most, exchange rate models have ignored the inefficiencies for firms and the official 
sector in having unpredictable exchange rates.  These models rest instead on the possibility that the 
unpredictability  could  arise  from  efficient  markets  as  in  Fama  (1965)  and  rational  expectations.  
According to such models numerous EUT competitive profit maximizers use all available information in 
an efficient manner, and apply it to exchange rate markets, eg Hu (1999), and argue that findings of 
inefficiency stem from using inappropriate tests, eg Wang and Jones (2002).   
One quandary for this efficient markets viewpoint is the systematic and highly significantly wrongly 
signed parameter estimate in interest parity models whenever the variation has sufficed to get sharp 
coefficient  estimates,  Rapp  and  Sharma  (1999).    An  efficient  market  ought  operate  to  eliminate  not 
exaggerate  arbitrage  opportunities.    Yet  for  over  five  years  on  end  in  the  1980s,  exchange  rate 
expectations in highly regarded sources moved every quarter in the wrong direction as did the forward 
rates compared to the subsequent actual spot rates, Frankel and Froot (1987).  
A second quandary is that the Fama concept of market efficiency is not a concept of the exchange rate 
simply being unpredictable.  The Fama concept is an outcome of “rational” maximization of expected 
profits  generated  in  the  form  of  an  equilibrium  and  thus  bedeviled  by  the  question  of  what  is  the 
equilibrium  that  the  market  so  efficiently  hovers  around,  Levich  (1989).    But  it  is  implausible  that 
equilibrium would be stable or unique given the negative findings with regard to other neoclassical, 
rational expectations and so forth modelling.  See eg Phelps (1999), Barnett and He (1999), and Sordi and 
Vercelli (2006). 
The third quandary is that people do not instantly know the equilibrium.  Instead it is proposed that they 
can learn it.  This, notes Phelps (1999), has the farcical aspect of what are people to learn – which 
particular economist’s model should they be learning? 
There is in addition to these three quandaries an overwhelming objection to such a Fama-Lucas world.  
This is the matter raised by Merton (2001) and Soros (1987, 1994, 2003), the matter of market power of 
key  speculators  that  such  models  irrationally  ignore.    Merton  (2001)  attributes  Long  Term  Capital 
Management's difficulties to a failure to understand this hedge fund's massive market power and the 
actions of the fund’s imitators and countermanders, factors assumed non-existent in efficient markets 
arbitrage formulae.   
Those with even more market power than private participants are the pair of official sectors who issue the 
pair of currencies.  By law under full cooperation the two official sectors fully determine the exchange 
rate.  The official sector currency swaps announced of 2007-2009 are examples of partial cooperation to 
stabilize exchange rates.  
4.d  Non-fundamental predictions 
If one deviates from equations predicting exchange rates on the basis of equilibrating fundaments, the 
picture is a little rosier.  Technical analysis seeks to identify upper and lower barriers beyond which it is 
unlikely that an exchange rate will move, barriers at which it is predicted that there will be exchange rate 
turbulence, reversals of trends.  The predictions can involve the judgment in discerning the patterns, in Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  7 
Nothing that is anticipated to be happen in the future in reality – ie within time –concerning risk that can 
impact on utility, is in EUT's equation (1).  The only way risk enters is atemporally, in how probabilities 
concerning the mutually exclusive outcomes aggregated to attain a single overall value of the alternative.  
Under EUT the atemporal aggregation rule is simple probability weights.  Under cumulative prospect 
theory  and  other  standard  rank  dependent  generalisations,  the  atemporal  aggregation  rule  is  a  more 
complex (de-)  cumulative probability function,  but  still  no  real time  risk  effects  are  included as  the 
anticipated utility mapping is identical to that of equation (1).   
See Appendix 4 on the numerous attempts to remedy this omission and why each attempt fails.  See Pope 
(2005, 2006) on why EUT cannot include more than one period, even after all risk is passed.  See Pope 
(2000) and Pope and Selten (2007) on how including in the utility mapping any risk effects anticipated to 
be experienced – ie anticipated to occur in future time periods – precludes deriving EUT's representation 
theorem. 
 
6  THE VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN CONTRADICTION 
Keynes had been interested in financial effects of uncertainty that fall on the investor following a decision 
to invest, Walsh (1996, pp52-65).  Von Neumann and Morgenstern had recognized that EUT missed out 
on some emotional uncertainty effects such as excitement that occur following a decision to gamble 
socially, ones to which they gave various names including the utility of gambling.  They had wished to 
expand their model to include them, but left the task to future researchers as they could not solve a 
contradiction  that  they  encountered  “on  this  level”,  (1947,  1972,  pp428-432).    To  include  choosers' 
anticipations of these uncertainty effects meant admitting that choosers were affected by the distribution, 
ie  by  an  interdependence  between  the  different  possible  outcomes.    But,  asked  von  Neumann  and 
Morgenstern, when each outcome in the distribution is mutually exclusive, how can a chooser be affected 
by their interdependence?3 
To get to the higher level where mutually exclusive outcomes can be interdependent (without the chooser 
being irrational), it is necessary to partition the future epistemically, by stages of knowledge ahead.  Upon 
making a risky choice, the chooser goes through what may be termed a pre-outcome period, a period of 
uncertainty, of ignorance of the final segment of his outcome flow.  During this period, since the risk is 
still unresolved, there can be an interdependence of the mutually exclusive outcomes in the chooser’s 
mind, Pope (1985a).  The chooser can hate or love the excitement of the tension created by wondering 
whether the good or bad outcome will occur, ie created by the interdependence of the good and bad 
outcome – created by the non-degenerate probability distribution over the outcome space.  Later, at the 
beginning of what may be termed the post-outcome period, the chooser learns the result of his choice, ie 
the later segment(s) of his outcome flow, has attained certainty.  But through historical legacy there may 
remain effects of the prior uncertainty.   
SKAT,  the  Stages  of  Knowledge  Ahead  Theory,  dissolves  the  von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern 
contradiction, and integrates earlier work on emotional risk effects with that on planning efficiencies via 
risk effects.  It allows us to identify other material and financial risk effects, to delineate the mutually 
exclusive cause effect chains that choice of an alternative would unleash – and to avoid conflating these 
                                                 
3  In the language of quantum physics for which von Neumann had constructed an axiomatisation ten years earlier, they 
termed this interdependence a complementarity. Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  8 
anticipations with atemporal weights used to aggregate these mutually exclusive cause effect chains.  For 
details on how this is effected, see Appendix 5 below, Pope, Leitner and Leopold (2006, 2009) and Pope 
and Selten (2009). 
 
7  SKAT’S EPISTEMIC STAGES 
The process of decision making starts before the point of choice at which EUT begins and at which each 
alternative V is evaluated in Figure 1.  There are at least two prior sub-stages.  See the first two rows of 
Table 1 and the first two columns of Figure 3. 
Table 1 
Three Epistemic Stages upon Encountering a Problem at Time t=-2 
 









pre-choice set:   prior to identifying the choice set 
pre-choice:   prior to choosing an act within the choice set 
Pre-outcome  prior  to  learning  the  outcome  of  the  chosen 
alternative 
post-outcome:  knowing the outcome of the chosen alternative 
 
Figure 3 
The Future Divided Epistemically – by Changes in Knowledge Ahead 
                pre-               pre-              pre-     post- 
epistemic         choice set            choice        outcome  outcome 
   stages          –2!t<–1             –1!t<–0           0!t<k    t"k 
       |_____________|______________|____________|____________ 
time points t          -1                0        k 
Note:  
1 The name of the first three periods starts with “pre-“ and then states an aspect of the future that the person will not yet have 
learned, namely in stage 1 the choice set, in stage 2 the choice, in stage 3 what will be the outcome of the choice, a stage that 
is degenerate, of zero duration, if the choice is a sure act, as then the chooser knows at the point of decision t=0 the outcome, 
ie in this case t=0=k.  If instead the choice is a risky act, stage 3, like the other periods, is of positive duration, ie t=k>0.  The 
last stage starts with “post”, and then states the aspect of the future the person that the chooser by then have learned, namely 
the final segment of the outcome flow. 
2 Each time point denotes a change in knowledge ahead, with one previously unknown aspect having become known, and the 
start of a new epistemic period that last until the next change in knowledge ahead. 
3 In the case of choosing a sure act, the outcome of the chosen act is already known.  Thus for sure acts the time points t=0 and 
t=k coincide – are simultaneous – and the duration of the pre-outcome period is zero.  It is only for risky acts that the time 
points t=0 and t=k fail to coincide – are non-simultaneous – so that the pre-outcome period of positive duration.  The false 
simultaneity postulate in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, 1947, 1953 and 1972), leading to their contradiction, had 
two prongs.  Prong a) was to explicitly set k to be simultaneous for all acts in their explanation of their axiomatisation.  Such 
simultaneity is incompatible with the theory including both sure and risky acts, when these are distinguished from each other 
by whether there is full or merely limited knowledge ahead of the outcome at t=0.  Prong b) was to implicitly set k=0 for both 
risky and sure acts in the atemporal axioms (ones lacking any epistemic division of the future from the point of choice). 
 
Each stage ends with a change in knowledge ahead about a different matter.  Stage 1 is over since the 
choice  set,  previously  unknown,  has  been  discovered.    Stage  2  ends  since  the  choice,  previously 
unknown, has been made.  Stage 2 ends, since the final outcome segment of the outcome flow, previously 
unknown unless this stage is degenerate as a sure act was chosen, has been learned.  After encountering a 
problem, there are typically a vast number of stages as new things are learned, almost minute-by-minute.  Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  9 
The reduction to only four epistemic stages in Table 1 and Figure 3 is because these portray an especially 
simple case where each change in knowledge is from ignorance about some future happening – ie at best 
probabilistic knowledge of what that happening may turn out to be, to certainty about that happening – to 
that risk being completely resolved.  
All that von Neumann and Morgenstern and EUT include is stage 3, the period that begins upon learning 
the outcome of the chosen act (and that lasts indefinitely in our simple scenario, not being followed by 
any other  change in  knowledge  ahead).    As  can  be seen from Figure  1,  EUT ignores the period  of 
discovering alternatives and evaluating them.  It assumes that the chooser can instantly and costlessly 
know the choice set, evaluate in a maximising way each of the available alternatives to choose, and then 
leap through the period of risk and uncertainty.  EUT thus maps into utility only the final segment of the 
outcome flow that began upon learning of the problem.  For the case where the chooser selects a risky act 
with, at the point of choice, multiple possible outcomes Yi, i=1, 2, ... , EUT attaches utility only to the 
outcome flow segment after the chooser has learned which final outcome segment has transpired – and 
attached utility to this final segment in a knowledge ahead independent way.  That is, EUT evaluates each 
possible as if there never was earlier any risk or uncertainty, as if the future were certain.  Thereby it 
excludes all real time effects of risk and uncertainty in the initial three stages, and also excludes any real 
time historical legacies of this prior risk and uncertainty in stage 3.   
When EUT skips all stages apart from the final post-outcome one, it assumes that evaluation is costless 
and timeless and can be a maximising process.  Such maximising however is infeasible, even to define 
and thus impractical to conduct.  As Savage (1954) observed, it is beyond our scope, even for a family 
picnic.  Savage sought to solve this practicality issue via maximising under a small worlds assumption.  
But identifying how it could render EUT practical, he found too difficult a task, and left it to future 
researchers.  To the authors' knowledge, no progress has been made since on rendering small worlds, and 
thus EUT, practical.  
Savage also tried another angle to substitute for explicit maximising, a clarifying sure-thing principle.  
But this has two shortcomings.  First, it cannot be applied in most circumstances.  Second where it can be 
applied  it  "clarifies"  by  truncating  the  probability  distribution  creating  a  delusion  of  certainty,  Pope 
(1991) – ie it is a patently irrational principle.   
SKAT, by contrast, permits the outcomes segment to include the evaluation stage and thus the non-
maximising  techniques  that  central  bankers  report  using,  eg  Papademos  (2006),  and  that  economists 
analysing central bank minutes, report that they use, eg Cobham (2006).  This is likewise the case for 
others whose actions influence exchange rates.  Pope et al (2008) illustrates SKAT for the Bank of 
England’s situation in the face of the speculative attack on the pound in 1992 culminating in inadequate 
official sector cooperation and Black Wednesday.  Appendix 6 below illustrates SKAT for the Banque de 
France which faced a speculative attack on the French Franc in the following year with a very different 
outcome due to a far greater degree of cooperation from the Bundesbank. 
 
8  AN OFFICIAL SECTOR COOPERATION-CONFLICT EXCHANGE RATE MODEL WITHIN SKAT 
SKAT permits us to start at the beginning of this process for the key participants in the exchange rate 
process.  In EUT and its temporal extensions and standard rank dependent generalisation, the decision Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  10 
process starts half way through.  In these, a choice can be costlessly and instantly made since each 
alternative has been costlessly and instantly evaluated via a maximising technique.  SKAT, by contrast, 
allows  us  to  start  earlier,  and  in  starting  earlier,  recognise  the  infeasibility,  impracticality  and  non-
employment of maximising techniques in choosing an alternative.   
 
8.a  The key players 
As in any modelling, we must abstract, we thus focus on key players in exchange rate determination, not 
on those with marginal influence.  In exchange rate determination, the key players are the issuers of the 
currencies, and those who decide how much is to be issued and under what conditions.  In this regard our 
focus accords with that advocated in Soros (1987, 1994, 2003, 2008, 2009).  Soros has been decisively 
more successful in predicting exchange rate changes than most of those who employ standard models that 
ignore the market power of key players and apply efficient markets formulae. 
A century plus back, these key players were the central banks of the leading power blocs of the UK, 
Germany, the Austro-Hungarian empire, and to lesser extents those of France and the US.  There were in 
addition  the  major  multinational  banks  that  in  many  lesser  countries  issued  currency  and  notes  and 
succeeded (and sometimes failed) to keep these private currencies on the gold standard.  A century plus 
ago therefore, in the determination of many of the exchange rates, the private multinational banks were 
also key players.  That situation however vanished, essentially just before the First World War when 
many countries instituted central banks and private banks lost their right to issue notes and coins.   
Today private bank currencies can be ignored.  Each currency area is supervised by an official sector that 
has the power to: 
1  produce in unlimited amounts its own currency and  
2  intervene on the foreign exchange market.   
For some currencies, powers 1 and 2 both reside exclusively in a central bank, eg for the EURO.  For 
some currencies, eg for the US dollar, there was historically a sharing of these two powers between the 
central bank and the treasury.  For yet other currencies, eg the Australian dollar, there is a sharing of these 
two powers among three branches of the official sector, the central bank, the treasury and the parliament. 
Powers 1 and 2 together imply that for each pair of currencies, total cooperation of the official sectors 
totally settles the exchange rate.  No speculator whether private or a third country's central bank has any 
scope to deflect the exchange rate over any significant period of time.  For an hour or two, there can be 
some deviation – since one of the central banks may have misestimated the extent to which intervention 
was required.  But apart from these minor transient frictions, the exchange rate is set. 
8.b   Behaviour of the key players – their "reaction" functions 
All unwanted exchange rate changes fall on a country from lack of complete cooperation of the two 
official sectors.  In this respect the situation of a modern official is similar to that of the gold standard era.  
That was not maintained by automatic mechanisms pertaining to how monetary policy influences prices 
or interest rates or capital flows.  Among the major players, it was maintained through all the normal 
unanticipatable fluctuations in inter-country balances that ensue via the gentlemen’s club.4  Central banks 
                                                 
4  Among minor players on the world stage who had difficulties staying on the gold standard, official sectors of the big 
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co-operatively shipped gold and silver and engaged in reverse rediscount rate changes as required, Hooks 
(2005).    Such  cooperation  is  dependent  on  individual  personalities  and  cultures.    It  is  disrupted  by 
changes in who were the central players and their degree of cooperativeness.  The disruption after the 
First World War (which gave key roles to non-cooperators, the US and France) ended the gold standard, 
Butkiewitcz (2005a, 2005b).  There was a like failure of co-operation for the incipient EURO group in the 
stances taken by Germany and the UK when unexpectedly needed, precluding at least temporarily, UK 
participation in the EURO.  There was limited cooperation, sufficient to limit the depreciation of the 
French franc, between the French and German official sectors the following year.  Overall, in his highly 
informative review, Cooper (2006b) concludes that there has been a growing degree of central bank 
cooperation on exchange rate management and other matters over the 50 years of the existence of the 
central bank organization founded to achieve this, namely the Bank of International Settlements. 
As Paul Volcker reports in an interview, Mehrling (2001), the US exchange rate is also a matter of 
cooperation among official sectors.  He explains that the era of a high dollar in the 1980s ended after the 
British  Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher  discussed  the  matter  with  Ronald  Reagan.    Without  such 
cooperation of a personal friendship, Germany's central bank had shortly before tried with insufficient 
success  to  unilaterally  get  the  US  dollar  down  via  exchange  rate  market  interventions.5    Margaret 
Thatcher's friendship with Ronald Reagan achieved the desired cooperation.  She informed Reagan that 
the damage being wrought on other countries (from the roughly doubling of the value of the US dollar 
and the roughly doubling of world wide interest rates) was unsustainable.  Reagan is reported to have 
understood and agreed.  He had also been facing years of complaints from exporters and others affected 
by the severe prolonged recession in the US.   
After  Maggie  Thatcher's  conversation  with  him,  the  combined  set  of  official  (fiscal  and  monetary) 
policies in the US altered in a way that the US dollar's value, had returned to its 1980's level by the end of 
the 1980s, as had interest rates, a change aided by a switch in who was White House Chief of Staff and 
who was the Treasury secretary.  The switch meant that the Treasury was no longer headed by the devout 
clean floater Donald Regan, but instead by the pragmatic Howard Baker. This episode is thus interpreted 
as a case of belated cooperation of the official sectors of the UK and the US.  It resulted in a return of the 
exchange rate between the US and other countries to what a set of influential countries deemed to be the 
appropriate level.  The cooperation, signed in the Plaza Accord (among the big five), went beyond an 
agreement to stabilise exchange rates henceforth.  It involved in effect reversing what had happened over 
the  last  three  years,  roughly  a  doubling  of  these  four  exchange  rates  in  this  brief  span.    For  Japan 
moreover, it involved a much faster doubling.  Further, Japan, unlike the other "big three), had not had 
such a marked depreciation of its currency in the 1980s, so that the shock for Japan of its currency almost 
doubling in value was far greater.  By 1987, the official sectors of big currencies had realised that both 
appreciations and depreciations and also their unpredictability were bad.  In the Louvre Accord, they 
agreed to keep major exchange rates stable.  That is, by 1987 there had been complete reneging on the 
                                                 
5  Such was the false belief in free floats, and in the helplessness of central banks at this time, that Dieter Sondermann reports 
as follows.  The general view of exchange rate dealers on the Bundesbank's intervention efforts was that these unilateral 
moves were counterproductive: they enticed dealers to think that the US dollar's rise really would have no end and via such 
anticipations, to push the US dollar yet higher.  However access to the daily data, and analysis thereof, suggests otherwise, 
Dominguez and Frankel (1990, 1993).  See also Frankel (1985, 1988, 1991, 1996) and Frankel, Bergsten and Mussa 
(1994).  On the other techniques besides intervention for an official sector to unilaterally influence its exchange rate, see 
Zemin (2007). Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  12 
virtues of clean floats, and effort instead to have an informal Bretton Woods with gentlemanly central 
bank cooperation affecting the stable exchange rates.   
8.c   Our Model  
Our model in its general form is an extension of that in Pope (1986).  It was extended from the single 
official sector with neutral other central banks, to the game theoretic perspective introduced by Reinhard 
Selten's inquiry about central bank conflict.  It was further refined by Juergen von Hagen's interest in the 
distinct  role  of  the  government's  fiscal  policy  independently  of  how  the  central  bank  as  a  separate 
organisation considered should be the stance of fiscal policy and despite the fact that both entities had a 
shared objective, namely the common good of their stakeholders.  This in turn reflects the assignment 
issue  first  raised  in  a  seminal  paper  on  how  macroeconomic  objectives  should  be  split  between  the 
treasury and the central bank, Swan (1952, 1953 and 1960).  Mundell (1961) discussed this assignment 
for the case of whether fixed or flexible exchange rates are better. 
Our model's key feature is the power of fully cooperating official sectors operating currencies, to fully set 
their pairwise exchange rate.  By implication, it follows that whatever exchange rate evolves can be 
expressed in terms of the degree of cooperation between those two official sectors.  Cooperation involves: 
a) sacrificing other official sector interests and  
b) fending off unwanted private sector pressures.   
Conversely, the extent to which exchange rate changes are undesired by one of the two official sectors, or 
even simply unexpected by one or both of them, can be characterised in terms of degrees of conflict 
between the two official sectors as regards: whether interest rates set assist in stabilising the exchange rate 
or in moving it to a jointly agreed upon new rate; official sector announcements of their exchange rate 
goals; official interventions; domestic price and inflation goals. 
Using historical episodes as reported by key official sector participants in the exchange rate process, we 
identified the following. 
(i)  A few individuals (who control each currency area's official sector), among themselves determine 
that official sector's degree of cooperation or conflict with each partner official sector. 
(ii)  These  people  are  human  beings  who  cannot  and  do  not  use  maximising  procedures  to  reach 
decisions. 
(iii) The personalities of those in these official sector roles with their resultant group dynamics matters – 
something not captured by assumptions of an unchanging culture and associated "reaction function" 
of the particular branch of the official sector. 
(iv) Even where the Treasury (finance department) of a government has no power over the issue of 
notes or coins or over foreign exchange rate interventions, through its fiscal and trade policy, it has 
an impact on exchange rate determination. 
(v)  Within the entire official sector (central bank, Treasury, State Department, Banking Supervisory 
Units, multiple instruments are available for implementing monetary policy.  Instruments include 
the setting of the terms for some interest rates, portfolio choice for the composition of central bank 
assets, any scope to set reserve requirements or emphasis on adherence to legal or implicit safety 
levels, announcements of official sectors and orders or requests to financial institutions.  Assertions 
that the official sector has only one monetary policy instrument are false.  Such assertions stem Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  13 
from the excessive simplifications employed in the algebraically oriented university education of 
economists. 
(v)  Multiple objectives often enter official sector exchange rate decisions. Assertions that monetary 
policy is invariably geared to a domestic price/inflation goal are false and relate to the excessive 
simplifications employed in the algebraically oriented university education of economists.  For 
major currencies, only for short periods between exchange rate liquidity shocks has the clean float 
conception of monetary policy exclusively geared to a domestic price / inflation goal has been 
implemented.    Over  longer  periods  spanning  an  exchange  rate  liquidity  shock,  official  sector 
monetary policy objectives of major currencies are better characterised as comprising at least seven 
goals, 1) stability of domestic prices, 2) forecastability of domestic prices, 3) appropriate interest 
rates,  4)  national  pride  in  meeting  exchange  rate  objectives,  5)  maintaining  international 
competitiveness,  6)  avoiding  domestic  over  employment,  and  yet  more  important,  7)  avoiding 
domestic underemployment.  Often after an exchange rate liquidity shock, there is also until more 
forgetting sets in, an additional objective 8) of financial stability.   
Our model thus embeds the following seven causal factors.   
1  A pair of official sectors that agree on a desirable exchange rate, and fully cooperate to attain it, set 
their exchange rate. 
2  Incomplete cooperation or conflict between a pair of official sector opens the way for influence of 
the  private  sector,  but  such  private  sector  influence  is  confined  –  confined  to  the  range  of 
disagreement  between  the  central  banks  on  where  is  the  exchange  rate  that  each  is  willing  to 
defend. 
3  Official sectors are hierarchical, with their decisions made by a few influential people. 
4  These influential decisionmakers use non-maximising techniques – heuristics – in reaching choices. 
5  Individual differences in the people holding power in these official sector hierarchies matter. 
6  Fiscal policy matters. 
7  Each official sector has typically multiple goals. 
These  seven  features  render  our  model  radically  different  from  those  with  reaction  functions  of 
maximising central banks, at most a couple of objectives, and no allowance for personalities, friendships, 
enmities and so forth between personnel heading either the central bank or treasury or parliamentary 
components of official sectors.  Our model differs even more radically from the majority of models of 
exchange rate determination as these do not include an official sector explicitly at all, considering only 
"fundamentals" and different sorts of private operators on the exchange rate market.  For instance there 
can be a mix of "informed" traders who employ a specific "fundamentals" model and "uninformed" 
traders who either seek to copy the informed traders or to employ chartist or other techniques. 
As regards currency traders, our model is rather standard, namely allotting a role to those firms effecting 
currency sales for purposes of trade in goods and capital.  What makes it non-standard is our recognition 
of how circumscribed is the role of the private sector.  We shall describe a particular version of our 
model in Part 11, the one that underlies a laboratory experiment.  First we offer in Part 9 some simple Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  14 
field evidence, and outline in Part 10 obstacles in going much further than this simple evidence using 
either an algebraic approach or econometric estimation. 
 
9   OUR FIELD EVIDENCE 
In this paper, as in Davidson (2009), the term liquidity shock is used in the generic Keynesian sense of a 
massive  (unpredicted)  change  in  the  price  of  an  asset.6    An  exchange  rate  liquidity  shock  will  be 
exacerbated if it is accompanied by an unpredicted rise in the cost of borrowing, or unpredicted inability 
to  borrow.    Such  shocks  endanger  no  merely  the  financial  sector  but  the  entire  real  sector  of  any 
economy. 
There are many countries and thus many exchange rates.  Let us be broad brush in our field evidence on 
whether clean or managed floating stabilises the exchange rate better. Let us focus on just two trading 
blocs, namely the US and those who entered the EURO. From 1970 until into this millennium, these two 
blocs have had the other as the key trading partner.7  Let us focus on just the exchange rates of these 
versus the US dollar.  
The 1998 and 2001 incipient exchange rate liquidity shocks for this set of countries were averted by the 
equivalent of managed float operations.  For details, see eg Davidson (2007).  This part of the paper 
examines  the  two  actual  exchange  rate  liquidity  shocks  for  this  set  of  countries:  (i)  the  unpredicted 
doubling of the USD in value in the early 1980s; and (ii) the unpredicted abrupt rise in the USD in value 
2006-2008.   
Consider first (ii).  It arose after the EURO had been formed with a clean float mandate and after non 
clean  floater  Alan  Greenspan  had  been  replaced  as  chair  of  the  US  Federal  Reserve  Board  by  Ben 
Bernanke.  On taking over, initially Ben Bernanke was decidedly more of the clean float persuasion,8 
focusing on incipient inflation dangers and raising official US interest rates on the eve of the exchange 
rate liquidity crisis that was beginning in mid 2006.  The extent of the 2006-2008 exchange rate liquidity 
shock was mitigated by central bank swaps. The US Federal Reserve organized these with the European 
Central Bank and Swiss banks in December 2007, and extended them to numerous other developed and 
developing countries in the wake of the disorderly collapse of the giant investment banker Lehmann 
Brothers  on  September  15
th,  2008.    These  central  bank  swaps  were  orchestrated  in  light  of  firms 
importuning the US Federal Reserve when unable to roll-over debts denominated in USD as the US sub-
prime crisis deepened and extended.  These firms were facing abrupt rises in the cost of USD and in 
interbank interest rates, when indeed interbank loans were available at all.    
Following  the  central  bank  currency  swaps,  many  exchange  rates  with  the  USD  by  early  2009  had 
returned to their mid 2006 level, the level prior to the sharp rise in the value of the USD as borrowing 
became more difficult progressively precluding firms from rolling over their USD denominated debts.  It 
                                                 
6 Thus in this paper, the term liquidity shock is not limited to the case where people retreat entirely from commercial assets 
and from transactions and put their savings under the mattress as in the narrower interpretation of this term in eg Kane 
(2009).  In this paper the term liquidity shock includes also situations where people have a “flight to safety” shock that 
massively and unpredictably alters relative asset prices. 
7 In the 1970s and to date, the EURO countries have been the US’s most important trading partner.  This was also true in the 
reverse direction until into the current millennium (statistical sources, the US Federal Reserve System and the European 
Central Bank.  In terms of capital flows, the other key determinant of exchange rates, it is reasonable to postulate that in both 
directions, the EURO countries and the US have found the other its key partner. 
8   His appointment was hailed as an opportunity for the transparency of a clean float regime, eg Barro (2005). Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  15 
is implausible that the rise in the value of the USD would otherwise have ceased so soon and reverted 
toward its pre crisis level so rapidly.  It is plausible that without the central bank currency swaps, the 
USD liquidity drought would have been many times more drastic.   
The authors have so far not located officers in any central bank who have stated that the swaps were 
perceived as averting an even more damaging rise in the value of the USD.  Therefore this curbing of the 
USD liquidity shock via central bank swaps cannot be described as an instance of a managed float policy 
implemented in order to stabilize exchange rates.  Rather the exchange rate stabilization was an incidental 
virtually unremarked outcome of the swaps.9  It was not the outcome of an intended managed float policy 
to stabilize the USD against either the EURO or any basket of currencies.  The unintended abrupt rise in 
the USD from mid 2006 can be attributed to numerous key currency official sectors taking a primarily 
clean float perspective.  
As the value of the USD receded in the wake of the currency swaps, China expressed doubts about 
continuing  to  hold  so  many  USD’s.    US  Secretary  of  State  Hilary  Clinton  in  February  2009  used 
diplomacy to seek to persuade China to buy more US Treasury Bills.  The Chinese foreign minister Yang 
Jiechi is reported to have informed Clinton of its hope that these US Treasury Bills remain for China a 
safe and liquid investment, Dasgupta (2009).  For US Treasury Bills to remain liquid for China, and not 
become illiquid (ie subject to a massive unanticipated adverse price change), the Yuan USD exchange 
rate needs to remain fairly stable.   
It is however far from clear whether the US official sector comprising the US Treasury and the US 
Federal Reserve jointly endorses a policy of a managed float aimed at this exchange rate staying constant.  
The US Federal Reserve perhaps seeks this.  But it and the US Treasury continue to face pressures from 
politicians representing exporters and its import competing sector who believe that a lower USD would 
boost employment and output.  Further many US academics and think tanks, including the prestigious 
Peterson  Institute  of  International  Economics,  favour  a  lower  USD  to  reduce  the  country’s  current 
account deficit.  It is thus unclear whether Hilary Clinton’s requests to the Chinese to continue buying US 
Treasury bills marks a switch in US policy to an exchange rate stabilizing managed float.  It perhaps 
merely points to conflict within US policy making between (i) those jockeying to continue the managed 
float policy to get the USD depreciated against the Yuan, and (ii) those jockeying to stabilize the USD 
against the Yuan, the EURO and other key currencies.  
It is similarly unclear to us whether the ECB’s acceptance of US Federal Reserve currency swaps.  Does 
its initiation of such swaps with other currencies in its region, herald a switch from the ECB’s former 
closed economy clean float rhetoric, and arguably formerly actual clean float policies?  Or is the current 
relative stabilization of the EURO/USD rate entirely an incidental outcome of other concerns?  
Let us now consider the exchange rate liquidity shock of the early 1980s. For both the US and those 
countries  that  would  become  the  EURO  bloc,  the  clean  floating  hey  day  was  the  early  1980s.    In 
commencing on his clean float fight inflation first goal in 1979, the incoming US Federal reserve Board 
chair  Paul  Volker  even  had  the  consent  of  his  German  central  bank  counterpart,  Otmar  Emminger, 
Volcker and Gyohten (1992, p168) and cited in Cooper (2006a).  The Plaza Accord of 1985 and the 
                                                 
9  Barkely Rosser alerted us to its incidental quality, an incidental quality affirmed in discussions by Nathan Sheets, Head, 
International Finance, US Federal Reserve Board, Washington DC.  We thank both for clarifying this issue, and correcting 
the prior draft that erroneously attributed to central bankers concern also for the exchange rate effects of the swaps. Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  16 
Louvre Accord of 1987 were essentially transatlantic government agreements to undo the exchange rate 
changes that arose under the clean floats.10  For the transatlantic bloc, if the clean float viewpoint holds, 
we might have anticipated that, compared to the 1980s, annual exchange rates would be more volatile in 
the 1970s, 1990s and in this millennium – as the floats were in these other eras were more managed.  The 
reverse prediction holds under the managed float viewpoint, namely exchange rate volatilities should be 
higher in the 1980s.  See Table 3. 
Table 3 
Annual Exchange Rate Volatilities 
 






















The annual exchange rate volatilities were symmetrised to avoid discrepancies between percentages being affected by which 
way the exchange rate is expressed, and thus by whether the former or later exchange rate is higher.  The symmetrisation was 
done by taking the average of the absolute annual percentage increments |et-et-1|/et-1 and | e t-et-1|/et.  This average in turn 
simplifies to 0.5*|(et-1/et - et/et-1|, where et is the exchange rate in year t, the number of units of the European currency needed to 
buy one USD.   
Source of annual exchange rate data: Matthew Shane, US Department of Agriculture. 
 
From Table 3, the clean float prediction is refuted, the managed float viewpoint supported.  The table 
presents the situation for the biggest three, Italy, France, Germany, and the entire 12 who entered the 
EURO in 1999.  Volatilities are about twice as high in the purer clean float decade. Though not depicted, 
the remainder of the 12 who formed the Euro likewise suffered volatilities in the 1980s almost double 
those of the 1970s, of the 1990s and in this millennium. 
This evidence hints that dirtier floats would have softened the worldwide exchange rate jars from the US 
giving massive tax cuts and sharply increasing its military expenditures in the early 1980s when the other 
major currencies were being fiscally conservative.  It hints at what might have happened if Italy, France, 
Germany – and above all the US – had pursued managed floats in the 1980s.  It hints that it need not have 
happened that European countries suffered over that decade a halving then doubling of the value of their 
currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar.  Ours is one interpretation of the shocking 1980s.  Ie the exchange rate 
shocks  would  have  been  less  marked  but  for  adoption  of  both  the  US  and  the  predecessors  of  the 
European Central Bank of especially clean floating for the first half of the 1980s.  It hints at Japan having 
been wise when it sought a stably evolving exchange rate with its key trading partner, and at China being 
wise in seeking this also, as proposed eg in Mundell (2002, 2005). 
The reverse interpretation of the shocking 1980s however can be offered – eg that the shocks would have 
been twice or ten times as big were it not for the rather clean float policies, and that the exchange rate 
changes would have been far smaller had only all the floats been completely clean.  Let us start with two 
unreasonable – but widespread – grounds for querying our interpretation. 
 
                                                 
10 In these accords, Japan, unwisely and irrationally according to Mundell (2003) and McKinnon (2005), was pressured by the 
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10  OBSTACLES IN PROGRESSING WITH ALGEBRA AND FIELD DATA 
10.a  Reverse interpretations 
A  reverse  interpretation  to  ours  of  Part  9  can  be  drawn  using  a  purchasing  power  parity  model  of 
exchange  rates  and  price  determination  holding  on  a  quarterly  basis.    On  this  model,  the  European 
currencies halved then doubled in value against the US dollar in the 1980s because European prices 
relative to those in the US, doubled and then halved.  These exchange rate convulsions caused by the 
relative price convulsions, would have been even worse but for the clean float policies of both countries 
keeping relative prices from convulsing even more.  But the model's pivotal implication for this era, 
namely the convulsion of transatlantic relative prices, did not happen.  Ie such a reverse interpretation to 
ours is falsified by a simple fact.   
The same simple fact, namely that European prices relative to those in the US, did not double and then 
halve in the 1980s, falsifies another suggestion.  This is the suggestion that there was no greater exchange 
rate instability in the decade of the 1980s if one uses "real" instead of nominal exchange rates. It is also 
useful to mention, that "real" exchange rates are heuristics – shortcuts that ignore the multiplicity of 
prices moving divergently.  All theorising and econometrics involves abstractions, ie heuristics, shortcuts.  
The heuristics of "real" exchange rates at times mislead trade theorists and the IMF in their exchange rate 
advice, generating sectoral output effects that are the reverse to those intended, Pope (1981, 1985b, 1987) 
and Pope and Selten (2002).  Being humans, we have to use shortcuts in the evaluation stage of making 
decisions, including decisions on what we conclude would be the impact of an exchange rate on an 
economy.  SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, allows us to notice that we economists do not 
maximise as expected utility assumes.  SKAT offers us the opportunity to start modeling economic agents 
as they are, non-maximisers, who can benefit from admitting that they use heuristics as this aids open-
ness  to  when  the  evidence  points  to  changing  the  heuristics  –  changing  our  models  and  estimation 
techniques. 
Grounds for querying our interpretation of Table 3 that cannot be excluded by how relative transatlantic 
prices in the early relative to the later 1980s, fall into three classes. 
1  Did we correctly classify the exchange rate regime in each epoque? 
2  Is our conclusion robust when we failed to keep other causal factors constant? 
3  Is our conclusion robust when we failed to model the micro-foundations of the economies? 
10.b    The regime classification  
The clean managed spectrum is multidimensional and thus opens the scope for disagreement on how to 
weight the diverse components.  In addition central bank policy is rarely completely transparent and there 
are documented instances of policy differing substantially from what is claimed, Alesina and Wagner 
(2005).  Further central bankers have been coy about the degree of dirtiness of their floats for multiple 
reasons, including concern of fanning speculation, concern at admitting their failures, concern about other 
central banks and governments disagreeing with their actions.  
Another problem here is that practices can diverge because of official sector learning and forgetting with 
each change in top personnel and each new constellation of external events.  This learning and forgetting 
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in dramatic changes in what the official sector does – while holding its regime constant. The situation is 
too complex for evident overall systematic learning by all participants however.  We have illustrated the 
difficulties with key players11 – central bankers and their economist advisers – in preceding parts of this 
paper, and in Appendix 7. 
In summary, getting a superior regime classification of matched periods when both transatlantic partners 
were adequately clean, and other periods when both were adequately managed, so as to discern the 
difference in impact on exchange rate stability, might not turn out to be exist.  It could transpire when we 
complete the analysis, that the only era of a really close match was both clean from 1982 to 1984.  That 
single clean float match, without a matched managed float era, would not suffice to enable us to infer 
anything about whether clean or managed floats better stabilise the exchange rate. 
10.3   Other things equal  
Suppose we did get matched periods for both regimes after our subtler regime classification.  We would 
still feel that the results (whichever way round they turned out) are questionable.  This is because we have 
ignored other causes like the exchange rates of other currency areas and shocks peculiar to each epoch.  
As regards, shocks, the 1970s decade included the aftermath of the worldwide grain crop failures of 
1969-70, and the two OPEC rises of the 1970s.  The 1980s coped with President Reagan’s fiscal spurt 
and its aftermath.  The 1990s began with the exchange rate crises of northern Europe and ended with 
those of eastern Europe and south east Asia.  This millennium had the shock of the ending of the US 
decade of private sector expansion.   We might wish moreover to list other shocks, to classify them by 
sorts, demand, supply expenditure switching, aggregate expenditure changing and so forth – in case these 
sorts have differential impacts on exchange rate stability.   
Suppose we succeed in doing this – mastering all the classification difficulties as regards the relative 
importance of other currency areas and shock types.  We would then need to consider lags, as not all 
these effects of regime, of other currencies and shocks impact within a day.  To have enough degrees of 
freedom, we would by now require a vast data set given how many other currencies there are in the 
world, and the multiplicity of shock types.  But given that some of the lags demonstrably exceed a year, 
we have only 36 years after the demise of Bretton Woods, and thus lack the data on this count alone.  We 
would need to do some approximations – cutting out what we guess are less important causes to do any 
empirical estimation.   
 
10.d  The micro-foundations  
Our  conclusion  might  also  be  questioned  as  being  too  aggregate,  lacking  specifics  on  the  market 
structure.  Unlike some other exchange rate conclusions, eg those based on Obstfeld (2001), we have 
ignored the differentiated nature of the products that characterize this inter-country trade.  We have left 
unanalysed the input and output market structures and how these evolved over time.  It might for instance 
matter that the US economy was less oligopolistic than the European market both as regards real sector 
                                                 
11 The situation is also difficult when we get to the minor participants in the exchange rate process – those in the private sector 
importing, exporting goods and capital, and even less direct participants such as those bargaining over wages that affect 
inter-country  competitiveness.    Investigations  reveal  highly  idiosyncratic  techniques  employed  in  the  decision  making 
procedures of each group, and quite a concentration of power rendering individual personalities and their general group 
dynamics of importance.  
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firms and financial intermediaries, and transatlantic cultural differences in agent's objectives might also 
matter.  
It might also matter how these differences have evolved over the post Bretton Woods era.  As regards 
financial intermediaries for instance, oligopolistic power has been accentuated via mergers and, in some 
areas, European takeovers (eg of virtually the entire US reinsurance business).  Objectives of the key 
figures  in  the  official  sectors  changes  with  reallocations  of  duties  and  personnel  changeovers  and 
unanticipated events.  Should they be modeled via an aspiration-adaptation model such as Selten (1999), 
or what?  Again, in the private, is its behaviour captured as a mix of two sorts of firms as regards 
international capital and goods flows, one sort prone to hedge their imports, and the other sort prone to 
speculate such as Kaiser and Kube (2005), or what?  This raises the general questions of:  
1)  goal differences amongst agents; 
2)  differences amongst agents in beliefs on what attains their goals, and  
3)  group dynamics arising out of 1) and 2) plus changes in the persons holding key posts. 
 
10.d  An algebraic  SKAT model 
It  might  seem  natural  to  develop  an  algebraic  model  of  the  exchange  rate  determination  process  to 
overcome the numerous legitimate queries of our interpretation of the field evidence in Table 3.  It might 
seem that the combination of the SKAT umbrella theory and the specifics of exchange rate determination 
delineated in Part 8 offer the golden opportunity for finally discovering all those "fundamentals" that have 
eluded us economists over the entire post Bretton Woods era.  It might even seem that out of it we can 
predict exchange rates reasonable periods ahead.   
A moment's thought however indicates that attaining a tractable algebraic SKAT model in the genre of 
Part 8 that yielded any conclusions whatsoever would be an interesting challenge.  Consider the matter of 
modeling how cooperation within a country's official sector, and between a pair of official sectors, change 
over time.  Consider the matter of including how this is influenced by personality changes in the (often) 
three branches of each country's official sector, and their associated group dynamics.   
Consider what would be involved in the above compared to the difficulties already encountered in our 
current exchange rate models.  Current models typically have two currencies – ie the issue of third 
currency areas is ignored or one small country.  Firms, where modeled, tend to be identical to households, 
and  do  not  hedge  or  speculate,  ie  there  are  no  domestic  or  international  financial  intermediaries.  
Alternatively, firms are implicitly perfectly competitive and of only two sorts, informed and uninformed.  
Alternatively, the current model has a market structure for labour inputs and market output.  In both cases 
firms / households (contrary to fact) have typically identical univariate objective for which maximisation 
is feasible to specify and done.  These simplifications seem needed for tractability.  In summary, SKAT 
algebraic modeling is worthwhile but awesome in the tractability issues from the need to limit the number 
of causal factors.   
Likewise  econometric  estimation  is  worthwhile,  but  involves  even  greater  difficulties.    To  get  the 
required constancy it needs numerous data points for every causal factor with responses to that cause held 
constant. As shown in Appendix 7, there is a freedom of degrees problem even were all data available.  
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with the needed matched exchange rate regimes across currency areas, since official sector heads who 
manage these regimes keep trying to learn and improve.  They episodically make different responses, as 
they notice something amiss, or because it is a new person at the top, yielding an overall pattern of 
learning and forgetting lacking the constancies required for robust econometric estimates of exchange rate 
regime effects on exchange rates.   
 
11  THE SCOPE FOR A LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 
A fresh insight can be a laboratory experiment.  The laboratory experiment avoids virtually all the above 
questionings of our above interpretation of the field data.  It also goes a long way toward avoiding the 
tractability issues for theory, and the constancy over time requirements of using field data for estimation.  
It can specify the markets for inputs, outputs and the exchange rate.  It can avoid external currencies that 
obviously impact, but are infeasible to incorporate in either algebraic models or empirical estimates.  It 
can allow firms to engage in both real and financial international transactions without rendering the 
model and its associated estimation too cumbersome.  It can specify the lag before agents can revise their 
decisions, and the number of changes that there will be in knowledge ahead that matter to agents, ie for 
how many periods ahead, unknown exchange rate changes can affect attainment of objectives.  It can also 
specify  the  objectives  of  each  agent  with  associated  monetary  rewards  for  attainment  of  that  set  of 
objectives.  And unlike all other forms of theoretical plus empirical investigation, it can leave those 
agents  free  to  decide  how  they  will  seek  to  attain  those  goals.    It  avoids  the  falsified  maximising 
assumptions underlying most theory and estimation techniques.   
Readers may however feel disconcerted at thinking that laboratory findings can shed light on the real 
economy,  especially when  in  the form of  a direct comparison  of  field  and laboratory  exchange  rate 
volatilities.  It is worth considering therefore how we see other contributions shedding light.  This allows 
us to see that we make just such direct comparisons in our traditional analysis.  This allows us to see that 
the  comparisons  process  is  not  different  in  kind  from  our  other  sources  of  knowledge,  each  has 
shortcomings, none is the Holy Grail, but each may shed light.  We need to be careful that we do not 
discard experimental evidence, when the identical sort of criticism can be leveled at our standard uses of 
theory and field data. 
In this regard, every paper potentially contributes to our accumulated evidence on whether a clean or a 
managed float ushers in more stable exchange rates.  Each bit of accumulated evidence may support one 
viewpoint or the other.  Or it may support neither, in this case hinting either at the need for more data, or 
form more complicated viewpoints (theories) on what keeps and exchange rate stable.   
Each  empirical  study,  whether  employing  qualitative  or  quantitative  methods  adds  evidence.    This 
empirical evidence can never be theory free.  Empirical work invokes theories of the market structure, of 
agent motivations, ways of neutralizing other factors that we could not hold constant, and of rendering 
interdependent cross sectional or time series data free of their serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and 
many other features that bedevil using them for estimation and hypothesis testing.  Despite all these 
additional  assumptions  invoked,  empirical  work  affords  us  additional  evidence  not  gleanable  from 
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Simulations can be of an empirical genre.  They are an empirical genre if they insert into theoretical 
models, parameters and lags obtained from empirical sources such as other econometric or input output 
studies.  Sometimes the empirical component is tenuous and the predictions ensuing implausible.  This 
can occur due to a failure to consider issues such as whether the variables are seasonally adjusted or 
unadjusted.    Failure  to  do  so  can  yield  bad  output  –  some  very  disturbing  simulation  results  –  as 
uncovered in the critique offered in Zellner and Peck (1973) of the FRB-MIT-PENN model of the US 
economy.   
Again, simulations that are not transparently documented on when parameters are simply assumed result 
in bad policy advice, including unwarranted complacency on world population growth.  Thus in the case 
of the agricultural sector of the ORANI 1979 general equilibrium model of the Australian economy of 
Dixon, Parmenter, Powell and Vincent (1979), the aggregate supply elasticity was for decades set at 40 
and maybe still is.  An elasticity of 40 somewhat accords with popular trade models that assume infinite 
supply elasticity of exports, and most of this sector's output is exported.  But it is a parameter value for 
which  there  is  zero  empirical  support.    Australia  has  essentially  no  scope  to  expand  her  aggregate 
agricultural output, only scope to switch under price incentives, from one agricultural item to another.  
That this parameter is contrary to all known about Australian agricultural production however has not 
been transparent to world wide users of the model.  It has resulted in CGE models around the world 
misconstruing the implications of population growth – misconstruing that the growth will be supplied by 
a massive expansion in Australian food output to feed the world, Pope (1997).   
Both the FRB-MIT-PENN model of the US economy and the Orani model of the Australian economy 
have some parameters and lags informed by empirical evidence, by econometrics and input-output data.  
When  combined  with  macro-financial-international  modules,  such  simulations  yield  exchange  rate 
predictions that stem from a mix of assumed and empirically grounded relations.   
Other exchange rate simulation models by contrast spring entirely from armchair theorizing.  None of the 
lags and none of the parameters have an empirical base.  Such simulations are of a purely theoretical 
genre of evidence.   
Yet even such purely theoretical simulations are deemed to potentially contribute evidence.  This is the 
justification for their production and dissemination.  The potential of purely theoretical work contributing 
is that we warrant the assumptions sufficiently good approximations to reality, and recognise that in all 
modeling we must abstract, ie merely approximate reality.  If not, we give no role to theory contributing 
to our knowledge base, Pope D and Pope R. (1972).  
Thus in purely theoretical modeling, both sides can and do construct models which they see as evidence 
for  their  viewpoint  of  how  exchange  rates  operate.    Inevitably,  these  stem  from  their  conflicting 
assessments of what assumptions yield good approximations of the workings of exchange rate markets.  
For tractability, nearly all theoretical models ignore the multiplicity of agents.  They rarely contain an 
official sector comprising more than one decision maker.  They rarely model firms involved in goods and 
capital flows explicitly.  They rarely combine different sorts of markets (eg competitive and oligopolistic) 
even though stylised facts suggest this.  In terms of decision making types, there tend to be a most two, eg Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  22 
one so called rational and one so-called noisy, and so forth.  All such simplifications are required for 
keeping the theory tractable. 
Further, as already mentioned at the start of Part 5, there are grounds for being very cautious as to 
whether anyone has reached first base in theoretical modeling of the actual exchange rate.  As shown in 
the remainder of that part, one reason for this failure is the use of standard theories.  These, when applied 
consistently, exclude nearly all the segments of the outcome flow that matter for the economic agents.   
 
12  OUR LABORATORY DESIGN 
Our laboratory experiment, inclusive of instructions to participants, is in Pope et al (2007).  It seeks to 
capture key features of corporatist union-influenced continental Europe and thus to aid particularly in 
examining exchange rate determination effects from a continental European perspective.  Output prices 
are determined in a Cournot market with a limited number of firms, while imported materials prices are 
competitively  determined,  and  wages  set  via  centralized  bargaining  between  an  employer  and  an 
employee  representative.    We  examine  the  effects  of  a  managed  float  in  which  central  banks 
automatically intervene to support the exchange rate target, varying the degree of transparency in the 
manner described at the beginning of section 12.e.  Central bank intervention limits are described in 
section 12.b.   
12.a  A concrete complex setting 
We make the context concrete to all participants, given the evidence that context affects decisions.  The 
world is complex so that conclusions drawn from simplified set-ups may miss effects, and this matter is 
especially important when the study concerns uncertainty, since uncertainty itself generates complexities.  
Our  design  is  a  compromise  between  the  complexity  of  reality,  and  other  constraints,  including  the 
number of seats in our laboratory, and the maximum time for which we keep participants in a session 
(one day).  To our knowledge it is the most complex experiment performed in an economics laboratory 
other than those on the Sinto market, Becker and Selten (1970), Becker, Hofer, Leopold-Wildburger, 
Pope and Selten (2006).  In this market, firms had to choose their range of products, their advertising, 
investment, and price for every product, taking into account how closeness in quality and price might 
influence demand, and how demand might be growing over time.   
Our set-up is too complex a business game to have a discernible game theoretic solution.12  Yet more 
complex experiments have however been conducted in psychology laboratories on economic decision 
making,  eg  Dörner,  Kreuzig,  Reither  and  Stäudel  (1983)  and  MacKinnon  and  Wearing  (1983).    To 
grapple with real world uncertainty costs, we sought as complex a design as was teachable to advanced 
economics students for them to play it within a day, and also theoretically analyzability with a game 
theoretic benchmark.  While lacking numerous aspects of real world complexity, it is arguably overall 
closer to reality than any of our current batch of theoretical and econometric models of exchange rate 
determination. This of course is a tricky judgment to make since reality has so many aspects, and we do 
not take the view that in every single aspect, there is not one model ever constructed that captures that 
                                                 
12Reinhard Selten has constructed (specially for our set-up) a new more realistic game theoretic equilibrium construct to use as 
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12.d  Exchange rate targeting and shocks 
From Table 5, in the two currency case central banks operate managed floats.  As in the 1961 Mundell 
model, they can target (manipulate) exchange rates so as to re-equilibrate the economy after shocks.  But 
we shed fresh light on the issue by dropping the assumption of there either only ever being one shock 
ever, or else (in models that extend Mundell), a set of shocks produced by a random generator and in each 
case external to the system, as it were from outer space.  In such Mundellian models the central bank 
knows perfectly the source of the shocks, exactly where the new equilibrium is.  We replace these false 
assumptions about shocks and knowledge of the new equilibrium in our laboratory experiment, having 
instead all shocks generated by the domestic official and private sectors in the two countries.  Thus in our 
laboratory set-up central banks and governments can be as fallible and error-prone as has been the Bank 
of England in its exchange rate policy according to Cobham (1994, 2002, 2006).  In our laboratory set-up, 
firms as in real life can attempt to make a profit out of exchange rate dealings if they think that one 
country's central bank has adopted an untenable position as regards its joint choice of exchange rate aim 
and interest rate relative to the other central bank.  Being also fallible, in our laboratory set-up, if firms 
misjudge the situation, they may lose funds on a grand scale (like Long Term Capital Management), or on 
a small scale (like some British universities with overseas campuses).  Out of this mix of varied fallible 
moves by members of the private and public sectors in the two countries, our experiment offers a fresh 
perspective on whether central banks really are able to use the extra instrument of the exchange rate to 
improve macroeconomic management, to restore equilibrium.   
12.e  The Private Sector 
Each official sector announces to all in each country its decisions on aggregate nominal expenditure, on 
the interest rate and its target price for next period.  In one treatment each official sector also announces 
its exchange rate target to all.  This might lead to a moderation of exchange rate moves – to the exchange 
rate staying more toward the middle of the range between the two central bank goals.  This could happen 
as often the interest rate incentive to shift funds will conflict with exchange rate incentive indicated by the 
official sectors generating either smaller private capital flows or two way counterbalancing flows.   
In  another  less  transparent  treatment,  exchange  rate  goal  information  is  shared  only  with  the  other 
country's official sector.  Here for the firms, the interest rate incentive is unconstrained by exchange rate 
information from the official sector.  Thus private sector capital flows might more often tend to push the 
exchange rate largely toward the extreme of one central bank's goal, and this might in turn accentuate 
exchange rate instability. 
After each official sector has set its four instruments, and made public knowledge all or three of these, 
private sector decisions commence.  First, in each country, the union and employer representative bargain 
over nominal wages.  The union representative’s payoff is real wages measured as nominal wages divided 
by the announced official sector target price, while that of the employer representative, is the average 
profit of the firms.  If after the set time allowed of 10 minutes, an agreement had not been reached, there 
was strike, with both negotiators receiving zero pay, a government set wage, and firms subject to a lower 
maximum production level and a cut in nominal demand relative to that announced by the government.   
Once the wage rate (from bargaining or a strike) was announced for both countries, firms decided on 
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exchange market in order to either hedge or speculate. The currency market then operated, and set the 
period’s exchange rate, followed by the consumer market, determining the consumer price, followed by 
firms paying for last period’s imported materials, and profits flowing to the firm’s owners.   
 
12.f  Rounds with interdependencies, sessions independent counterfactuals 
A round is the above sequence of decisions and their outcomes played by both the official and private 
sectors.  A round was played by the same participants 20 times, with a lunch break, typically after the 8
th 
period.  The first round was preceded by an hour’s instruction. The participants were economics students 
at Bonn University who had passed two or more years of economics, ranging in skill from those in their 
third  year  of  undergraduate  economics  up  to  doctoral  candidates.  There  were  six  sessions  run  on  6 
different days in 2003 with the exchange rate aims of the two central banks announced to all.  An 
additional three sessions run in 2005, with the exchange rate aims known only to the two central banks.  
Each of the 9 sessions contained different participants.  
By the end of the associated set of experiments, we have almost exhausted our available pool of different 
willing participants.  The sessions were typically on Saturdays, since few participants were available for 
an  entire  Monday  to  Friday  weekday.    No  session  had  to  be  abandoned  on  account  of  participants 
becoming bored or too depressed at their earnings prospects to continue for the whole day.  Indeed, 
especially doctoral students often reported how interesting was the experience, and how instructive in 
macro-international  finance.    Many  participants  asked  for  permission  to  repeat  but  were  refused.  
Participants were paid in proportion to their task achievement.  Appendix 8 gives the details of how many 
EURO each participant received for each level of attainment.  Participants' earnings varied markedly 
depending on the session and role.  They typically earned between the norm and double the hourly rate 
students in Bonn obtain in outside casual employment, but some virtually none, and many others more 
than fourfold the normal rate. 
Our nine independent sessions each of 20 periods means that we have a huge advantage over field data 
with its time series and cross sectional interdependencies.  Our field data stem from a single world and a 
single history, rendering it tricky, to say the least, to decode the effects of the shocks of the 1970s, the 
1980s, the 1990s and this millennium.  In particular, how do we answer from field data alone that key 
counterfactual of how would exchange rates have moved in the 1980s under no shocks or smaller or 
different shocks and a managed float policy?  The laboratory offers us a fresh handle.  We have nine 
sessions of the managed float, with each with different players, and thus differing propensities to generate 
shocks, and all our shocks caused by people – as have been nearly all our field shocks.  We have 9 
counterfactual worlds to aid us in assessing exchange rate regimes. 
12.g  The round: its real world duration counterpart 
12.g.i  The multiple actual decision frequencies simplified to a single one, a year 
In actuality, some types of decisions are made at a far higher frequency than are other decisions.  To 
capture a reasonable proportion the actual differential frequencies requires a highly disaggregate input-
output structure identifying the differential production lags of different items used in the production 
process from bread for sandwiches to steel for mines, from coins in the till, to long term credit, from 
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complex, that even in input output studies, differential frequencies are virtually never investigated or 
modeled.  In virtually all theorising and most empirical work, there are not even multiple input-output 
layers, and even where present, no allowance for differential frequencies of decisions.  Our set-up, whilst 
having two input-output tiers, likewise suffers the shortcoming of setting the frequency of all types of 
decisions to be identical.  We made this compromise with an eye to keeping the game playable as regards 
participants’ understanding and their time needed to make each decision, within a single day when 20 
rounds are involved. 
Setting all frequencies as in our laboratory set up to be identical has the massive advantage over field 
empirical  data  that  we  avoid  all  the  implicit  aggregation  assumptions  about  why  the  differential 
frequencies assumed away do not bias the results – implicit since the actual aggregations are too complex 
to readily start considering.  It however sets another question: how does one of our periods relate to actual 
time flows?  We designed it as an approximation to each period being a year.   
Our reasoning leading to each period denoting a year started with a lower bound on the duration of each 
period being investigated via our laboratory technique.  We did not wish to model events in time intervals 
shorter than six months.  Shorter durations have limited relevance for the normative issue of exchange 
regime being investigated for two reasons.  First, fluctuations in exchange rates that roughly iron out in a 
shorter time span have only a modest impact on international trade in goods and services.  It is longer 
lasting adverse changes in the exchange rate that damage international trade.  Not surprisingly, most 
exchange  rate  studies  of  the  impact  of  exchange  volatility  on  trade  find  a  minimal  effect  –  not 
surprisingly since these virtually all use data where the individual observations concern daily, weekly, 
monthly or quarterly data – not data of a long enough length to be relevant to most trade decisions.   
Second,  shorter  term  self-reversing  changes  in  domestic  economic  activity  and  relative  prices,  a 
government’s  macro-economic  policy  smoothes  with  automatic  stabilizers.    Of  then,  frequencies  in 
excess of six months, what is a rough approximation of the lags and their associated flow durations in 
setting exchange rates that led us to select the year as the benchmark duration, and design the set-up to 
very approximately mirror?  In taking a year, our thinking stemmed from the evidence described in the 
following section. 
 
12.g.ii  Actual average decision frequencies in trade 
Production varies with a) demand and b) relative prices.  The frequencies of actual changes in some 
components of demand and of relative prices are at least daily.  But firms do not respond so rapidly.  
There is a dearth of information on the actual lags.  A source is Pope (1981, 1987) concerning value-
added in the Australian manufacturing sector over the period 1950-1980.  At that time the estimated 
average lag of production behind demand was a quarter, and behind relative price changes, five to six 
quarters.14   
Lack of data prevented estimating the additional lag of payments, and thus approximately, the foreign 
exchange market impact, behind changes in production.  However nearly all international trade in goods 
                                                 
14  With computerised accounting, and a higher share of the labour force in part-time jobs in some countries (most notably 
Australia who now leads the world in its proportion of part-time jobs), the average lag in response to demand may have 
reduced.  The lag in response to relative prices however is unlikely to shorten much since responses to relative prices 
typically requires complex changes in production techniques, and thus only made at annual board meetings and after 
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and services is on credit, and the credit to settlement date some two months longer than on domestic 
transactions, and, while like all credit settlements with a lag sensitive to the business cycle, very roughly 
in the order of a four month lag from receipt of the imports.  This suggests average lags of about two 
quarters  before  changes  in  demand  causing  changes  in  goods  and  services  flows  to  impact  on  the 
exchange rate.  It hints at an average lag of six to seven quarters before changes in relative prices causing 
changes in goods and services flows to impact on the exchange rate.   
The average of these two markedly different frequencies depends on the variation in trade and goods 
flows  arising  from  changes  in  demand  compared  to  those  arising  from  changes  in  relative  prices.  
Variance  in  demand  is  for  many  countries  marked  compared  to  that  of  changes  in  domestically 
determined relative prices, but tiny compared to that from internationally determined relative prices, 
namely those for commodities (oil, coal, iron ore, agricultural and pastoral products determined in the 
international market, and so forth), and coming through the role of exchange rate changes altering import 
and export prices.  It thus seems not unreasonable to postulate that the average lag for the two when 
computed via their variances may be around 5 quarters.   
 
12.g.iii  Actual average decision frequencies in capital flows 
The other components of private sector demand for a country’s exchange rate stem from its capital flows.  
These comprise ones with an extremely short average lag and others with a very long average lag.  Hot 
money, and some portfolio investment, respond in less than a day to alterations in relative interest rate 
and exchange rates, though there continue to be responses.  Direct investment by contrast has typical lags 
of years between considering an opportunity and deciding on the terms and amount to invest, and then 
lags of many months, or even years after the deal is finally clinched, before all the capital flows have 
occurred, both because of the time required to raise the requisite capital,15 and the typical decision to 
undertake the direct investment in a sequence of stages with each stage up to two years apart.  The 
volatility of long-term investment is substantial,16 but that of hot money is legendary.  Splits of capital 
flows into these two components are tricky, and indeed the capital flows themselves even for many 
developed countries subject to errors of the order of magnitude of 20%.  
There is a presupposition that short term flows are more volatile than at least some long term forms like 
foreign direct investment, eg Stiglitz (2000).  But the authors have been unable to locate a corroborating 
study.  They have instead located studies indicating comparable or even greater instability in long term 
capital flows compared to short term ones.  Eg Fleissig (1971) found the US long-term capital account to 
be the culprit in that country’s contribution to the international severity of the 1930s Great Depression 
since long term US capital investment abroad shrank dramatically in 1927, 1928 and 1929, while short 
term flows remained constant.  Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1995) study a range of developed and 
developing countries with data from the early 1970s to the early 1990s.  They found that long term flows 
were often as volatile as short term flows, that it takes as long for a shock to die out in the case of the long 
term flows as with the short term ones, each with lags of around 16 quarters, and that the long term flows 
                                                 
15  In this respect, consider for instance the delays in 2001 that cost Germany’s Telecom dearly in cobbering together its 
EURO funds to transfer for the purchase of US Wireless after all terms of the purchase were finalized.  These coincided 
with an unanticipated drop in the EURO, attributed in the media to a set of massive EURO direct investments (from France 
and Germany), all in the form of takeovers of US firms.  In turn, most of these takeovers were deals clinched prior to the 
breaking of the US bubble. 
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are as least as unpredictable.  Singh (2002) offers a range of reasons for anticipating long term capital 
flows to be as volatile as short term ones.  We thus have taken as a working hypothesis that both short 
and long flows are equally volatile.   
When both short and long term capital flows tend to have like autocorrelation properties, it is not too 
crucial to estimate the shares of short and long term capital flows.  The data from Claessens, Dooley and 
Warner (1995) reveal no average difference, but big differences between countries, eg the UK was almost 
exclusively long term for their data period but Germany with at least 10% more in short term flows.  The 
statistical results reported in Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1995) point to an average lag of between 
two and four quarters, depending on whether one looks at their half life estimates or their autocorrelation 
estimates.  Splitting the difference, the average lag discernible from their statistical analysis might be 
three quarters.   
Taking a simple average of our rough estimates of the trade and capital flows average lags, we take our 
periods as years.  We thus use annual exchange rate data in comparing our experimental results on 
exchange  rate  volatilities  under  the  set-up  of  a  very  managed  automatic  intervention  institution  that 
includes the goal of maintaining international competitiveness with actual exchange rate volatilities. 
 
13   RESULTS 
13.a Averages 
There were no effects that suggest systematic learning over the 20 periods played.  This parallels the 
apparent actual lack of learning in the complex world of floating exchange rates from 1970 to date.  See 
Appendix 7.  As economists predicting exchange rates via their models have yet to establish that they 
have learned to make predictions better than a random walk out of sample in under two years, so also our 
firms  failed  to  predict  the  exchange  rate  changes  wrought  by  their  own  actions  in  conjunction  with 
official sectors, Kaiser and Kube (2005). 
With no evidence of learning in our complex laboratory set-up designed to mirror real world complexity, 
we therefore report and analyse here simply the average exchange rate volatility of each session, Table 6.  
It can be seen that for those laboratory sessions with a less public exchange rate aim, and thus in this 
sense more managed float, the average volatility is over double that of the other six sessions.  On a non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U-test, this is a significant difference at the 5% level.  This is suggestive of 
more transparent managed floats aiding in exchange rate stabilization.   
Let us now compare the above laboratory volatilities for a two currencies and trading blocs case, with 
those experienced between two actual sets of currencies and trading blocs – the EURO bloc and the US – 
since the demise of Bretton Woods, summarised in Table 4, Part 8 above.  For the 1970s, 1990s and for 
the current millennium, the exchange rate volatilities of the EURO countries with the US are in the 
vicinity of double that of the laboratory managed float with open exchange rate aims.  For the 1980s, the 
hey-day of clean floating, these countries suffered exchange rate volatilities in the vicinity of four-fold 
the volatility of the those in the laboratory experiment with their managed floats.  The other epoques were 
murkier, in between clean and exchange rate stabilising managed floats given the documented flip-flop 
changes in regime policies of official sectors depending on whether they perceive it as more urgent to be 
seen to be exclusively concerned about curbing inflation or attending to other needs of the economy.  Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  30 
Table 6 
Laboratory Exchange Rate Volatilities with two Currencies and Trading Blocs 
 
Six Sessions with Public Exchange rate aim 
Session  1  2  3  4  5  6  Overall 
Average per period  .085  0.024  0.033  0.017  0.039  0.030  .038 
 
Three Sessions with Exchange Rate Aims only Known to Other Central Bank   
Session  7  8  9        Overall 
Average per period  .057  .21  .07        .112 
 
The exchange rate volatilities were symmetrised to avoid discrepancies between percentages being affected 
by which way the exchange rate is expressed, and thus by whether the former or later exchange rate is higher.  
The symmetrisation was done by taking the average of the modal absolute percentage increments |et-et-1|/et-1 
and |et-et-1|/et.  This average in turn simplifies to 0.5*|(et-1/et - et/et-1|, where et is the exchange rate in period t, 
the number of units of home currency needed to buy one unit of foreign currency.   
 
 
The laboratory results thus hint that when countries float managed with a transparent exchange rate aim 
and respond to the normal panoply of domestic objectives as regards prices, interest rates, over and under 
employment  and  international  competitiveness  in  determining  their  exchange  rate  aims,  the  resultant 
exchange rates are likely to be far more stable than when many central banks follow price/inflation clean 
float policies as has been the case in the last few decades.  The results suggest that if central banks have a 
basket of goals, including international competitiveness, an exchange rate aim, and active intervention, 
exchange rates would likely have been far steadier.  If however the exchange rate aim is not transparent, 
the  laboratory  results  thus  suggest  that  the  managed  float  is  significantly  worse  in  stabilizing  the 
exchange rate than when this is public knowledge to all players – not merely a secret among central 
banks.   
 
13.b  Dispersion, Outliers 
Many of us would see an influence for instance for the particular personality of a central banker or a 
particular president, in actual exchange rate determinations, eg a role for the personalities of US Fed 
Chairmen Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan, and for the US President Ronald Reagan.  Our theories have 
difficulty (understatement) in allowing for these differences and when unanticipated, their shock impacts.  
We need such information about such deviations from central tendency.  We live in only one world with 
one history.  Bad luck for the world if we economists advocate policy “reforms” that on average work, 
only we considered no escape routes if reality proves not to be close to the average, but an outlier on the 
wrong side.   
The dispersion of possible outcomes can pinpoint dangers in reform policies. Attention to dispersion is 
consistent  with  SKAT,  the  Stages  of  Knowledge  Ahead  Theory.    It  is  inconsistent  with  EUT  and 
axiomatised expected utility theory.  That theory precludes a concern about dispersion.  This point was 
brought to the attention of the English speaking EUT community in Borch (1969) and Feldstein (1969).  Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  31 
Allais  mentioned  this  incompatibility  in  an  Econometrica  article  in  1953,  but  in  French,  therefore 
somewhat inaccessible to many.  Its stronger restrictions on when by accident an EUT theory would yield 
the same conclusion as if variance mattered, are in Schneeweiß (1968a, 1968b, 1973a, 1973b).  EUT’s 
focus on expectation, exclusion of dispersion about the expectation, has inhibited economists and the 
organisations  that  they influence,  from considering  outliers,  considering  dispersion.    In  turn this  has 
contributed to a lack of concern that an intended reform might not operate as anticipated.   
Our statistical significance techniques postulate multiple other worlds.  We ought make better use of our 
standard errors and confidence intervals in our statistical estimates to entertain the notion of dispersion 
and its dangers in appraising economic policies.  SKAT affords us a consistent means of including these 
considerations in our appraisals of exchange rate regimes. 
Experiments  offer  us  yet  another  angle  on  dispersion,  on  outliers,  on  idiosyncracies  arising  from 
individuals and their group dynamics. Virtually nothing else is different in these independent sessions, 
only the individuals and their group dynamics. Laboratory experiments are a handle on whether the 
outliers are close to the average, or far away, ie on how dangerous are our “reforms” due to unpredictable 
and unmodeled idiosyncracies.   
Let us therefore, with the umbrella of SKAT, look at the average volatility in each of the nine individual 
laboratory  sessions.    Their  dispersion  is  a  measure  of  our  degree  of  uncertainty  in  drawing  policy 
conclusions due to the role of individual differences or group dynamics.  In one of the six sessions where 
the exchange rate aim was transparent, known to all agents, the average volatility was high, namely that 
listed as session 1 in Table 2 above.  This indicates that transparency on the exchange rate aim aids, but 
does not guarantee, the roughly halving of the volatility found to be associated with rendering the float 
transparent in its dirtiness.   
Again, in one of the three sessions with a non-transparent aim, the one that we labeled as session 8 in 
Table 5, there is an outlier so high as to indicate that under a non-transparent managed float, the volatility 
might even be as pronounced as under a clean float.  Transparency is often hard to attain, for reasons 
discussed earlier.  This outlier points to countries that seek the benefits of stable exchange rates shifting 
out of floating altogether.  It points to such countries considering dollarisation or currency unions or a 
single world money, as advocated in eg Cooper (1984, 2006, 2009), Alesina and Barro (2001), Courchene 
(1999a, 1999b) and Courchene and Harris (1999), Rose (2000, 2004), Mundell (1961, 2003).  
In turn, managed floats that stabilize the exchange rates, or better still a single world currency enable 
better macroeconomic management, in particular to better stabilize international competitiveness, Pope et 
al (2008).  Presumptions to the contrary, that the extra degree of freedom of official sectors being able to 
alter the exchange rate in the wake of shocks rest on simplified algebraic models.  These ignore real 
world complexity for members of the official sector in discerning disequilibria and responding to them.   
 
14 CONCLUSIONS 
The paper has traced the failure of economists to predict exchange rate changes to the degree needed for 
good macroeconomic management and avoiding needless firm bankruptcy.  There have been now over 35 
years  of  efforts  to  get  these  predictions  since  the  breakdown  of  Bretton  Woods.    Official  sectors, Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  32 
academic economists and private agents alike have failed to predict the extreme damage of world wide 
exchange  rate  liquidity  shocks  that  twice  occurred,  nor  the  other  two  such  shocks  that  would  have 
occurred but for rapid action of Alan Greenspan and the US Federal Reserve Board.   
After the extreme exchange rate liquidity shock of the 1980s, official sectors of the key currencies did 
recognize  the  value  of  managed  floats  to  stabilize  exchange  rates,  and  implemented  exchange  rate 
coordination via the Plaza Accord of 1985 and the Louvre Accord of 1987.  But within seven years, 
numerous  official  sectors  had  reverted  to  the  clean  float  policy.    This  is  an  astonishing  speed  of 
forgetting, even allowing for rapid personnel turnover, and the famously short sighted perspective of 
current day economists who have eliminated both history of thought and economic history from their 
teaching syllabi.   
Again, in 1998, Alan Greenspan then chair of the US Federal Reserve, ensured an orderly collapse of the 
giant hedge fund Long Term Capital Management after it grossly mispredicted the USD-ruble exchange 
rate.  Without this rescue Greenspan feared a 1929 style depression being unleashed from the dislocation 
of international financial markets.  It is astounding that the needed rescue did not revive awareness of the 
necessity  for  stable  exchange  rates  and  adequate  government  regulation  for  stable  financial  markets.  
Instead the very next year the reverse occurred. There was increasing clean float rhetoric and in the US 
the  repeal  of  the  1930s  Glass  Steagall  act,  a  repeal  that  enabled  US  commercial  banks  to  directly 
precipitate an exchange rate liquidity crisis via their mortgage securitisation sales to foreign commercial 
bank counterparties and others.  Indeed this is precisely what ensued. 
The blindness of official sectors to the impending exchange rate liquidity shock in 2006, like their rapid 
forgetting of the 1980s exchange rate liquidity shock, lies in cognitive dissonance.  Members of official 
sectors  have  been  educated  within  the  epistemically  atemporal  maximizing  lens  of  expected  utility 
neoclassical  theory  wherein  there  can  be  no  exchange  rate  liquidity  shocks.    They  lack  a  coherent 
framework for analyzing what actually happened in the early 1980s, as also for what has happened 2006-
2009.  Members of official sectors need an alternative coherent intellectual framework that matches the 
broad contours of reality in its abstractions and faces the reality of non-maximising but within a coherent 
framework, potentially sensible decisionmaking procedures of human beings.   
To be coherent, the alternative framework must abandon epistemically atemporal expected utility theory 
that ignores the essence of risk, namely the anticipated changes in knowledge ahead.  SKAT affords such 
a framework.  Within the umbrella of SKAT, our central bank conflict cooperation model of exchange 
rate  determination  allows  understanding.    Understanding  does  not  mean  prediction  of  exchange  rate 
changes.  Understanding includes understanding that exchange rates are inherently unpredictable because 
of the personalities of key deciders and their interpersonal dynamics, the multiple sorts of agents who 
impact  on  exchange  rates,  the  multiplicity  of  exchange  rates,  evolving  resources,  and  other  factors 
inducing  complexity.    Our  field  and  laboratory  evidence  demonstrate  the  illusion  of  chasing  a  new 
generation of exchange rate models that will predict and just keeping multiple currencies.   
Prior to the advent early last century of numerous national central banks advised by often unintentionally 
nationalistic economists, the gold standard held.  Adherence to the gold standard was freely attempted by 
private sector unregulated banks, and in more advanced countries generally succeeded in being adhered to 
without exchange rate liquidity shocks of exits from that system, David Pope (1991, 1993), Flandreau Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  33 
(2003).  Bretton Woods avoided some of the shortcomings of the gold standard, but did not entirely 
eliminate the risk of exchange rate liquidity shocks.  After Bretton Woods, official sectors and private 
agents have to deal with the unnecessary additional layer of complexity of being unable to predict the 
exchange rate, and suffering episodic exchange rate liquidity shocks.  Unlike many other demand and 
supply shocks in the system, exchange rate shocks are avoidable, and from our field and laboratory 
evidence, it is highly desirable to induce a new international financial architecture within a single world 
currency.  
Advocacy of such a single world currency is an interpretation of a speech given on the 23
rd March 2009 
by Zhou Xiaochuan, head of the People’s Bank of China.  Such a single world currency could arise by 
modifying the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights beyond the extent proposed subsequently by the Russian 
and Chinese governments, see eg Media Resources (2009), and backed transitorily by Geithner, see eg 
Marquit (2009).  It could moreover be ushered in, as was the EURO, without exchange rate liquidity 
shocks of jolting the pre-existing exchange rates.  
 
Appendix 1 
THE CLEAN FLOAT 
Its domestic price orientation 
Under Friedman’s notion of a clean float, the country’s central bank gears its monetary management 
exclusively to the domestic price level – or as a surrogate, inflation, an arguably inferior goal, Swensson 
(1999).  Under more eclectic notions, the clean float concept extends to all closed economy goals of an 
economy.   Initially clean float purists completely ignored any potential impact monetary policy might 
have on the exchange rate, eg Carew (1985).  But the domestic price level indirectly influences, and is 
influenced by, the exchange rate – because of the export and import effects of international capital, trade 
and services flows that impinge on domestic prices and employment, Pope (1986).  
Its evolution to partial open economy modelling 
The  closed  economy  perspective  of  clean  floaters  is  changing  toward  a  recognition  of  some  open 
economy aspects.  Some now consider the effects that the exchange rate can have on domestic goals in 
what is termed the new normative macroeconomic research agenda, Taylor (2001).  Today also some 
clean floaters give exchange rate interventions and associated announcements an instrumental role in 
attaining  price  and  inflationary  goals  via  signaling.    Eg  the  German  central  bank  explained  some 
exchange rate interventions in defence of the DM as signaling – according to Sam Cross’s notes for a US 
Federal  Reserve  System  meeting  (1990).    Such  signaling  is  also  modeled  in  so-called  rational 
expectations models of clean floating, eg Svensson (2003). The country’s exchange rate is not a goal in 
its own right.  But it has become for some clean floaters, a recognized instrument for attaining the 
domestic price / inflation goal. 
The moderate clean floater relegates to a footnote – and the extreme clean floater wholesale ignores – 
collateral exchange rate damage caused to its own or other economies as regards output, debt and asset 
transfers.  It might be thought therefore that clean floating is only considered viable for small countries 
without close connections to any other small country as regards trade and capital flows.  Under such Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  34 
conditions it could be that the damage that they may wreak on other countries is minor enough to be 
ignored.  However, as will be seen in sections 1.3 and 1.4 below, clean floating is advocated for big 
countries, and in the fifteen years prior to the eruption of the US sub-prime crisis in 2007, was being 
practised by many of them.  
Evolution in the implementation of clean floats 
The details of how to implement a clean float have varied over time.  This mirrors monetarists’ altered 
understanding of the impact of money on prices and inflation, and on whether fine-tuning is feasible.  
There was a fine tuning era of interest rate targeting in the 1960s to early 1970s.  Then there was a non-
fine  tuning  era  of  money  stock  targeting  over  roughly  the  next  15  years.    This  followed  Milton 
Friedman’s 1969 discovery that the lags before money impacts on prices are long and variable, and 
essentially under a two-year horizon unpredictable.  Subsequently, with no new information that money 
has more predictable and shorter lags, an era has arisen in which the clean float operates via interest rate 
changes as indicated by price changes.  This new clean float era arose from difficulties in relating the 
money base to price changes, and difficulties in giving a long-term stability rule for interest rate changes 
equivalent to the Friedman money stock rule. There are indications of clean floaters reverting from a 
focus on interest rates for fighting inflation to Friedman’s call to focus only on the money stock, eg 
Kilponen and Leitemo (2007).  The new clean float era has progressively taken longer perspectives about 
how interest rates influence prices / inflation.  In practical policy and reports of success, a vagueness has 
entered  via  words  such  as  the  “underlying”  inflation  rate.    Discretion  is  advised  on  just  when  to 
implement anti-inflationary measures so as to limit deficient output and unemployment, eg Bernanke’s 
2003 talk in praise of best practice explicit inflation targeting.  A discretionary lull in fighting potential 
inflation is practiced by clean float inflation fighters such as Sandra Pianolto during the “unwelcome 
disinflation” of 2009.  This board member promises that the US Federal Reserve will “shift … making 
sure that higher inflation does not develop  … [as i]t’s the job of the central bank to keep inflation under 
control”, while avoiding indicating when this shift will take place, Pianolto (2009).  Other clean floaters 
contend that an explicit target number for inflation would mitigate deflation dangers by incentivising the 
central bank to keep monetary policy adequately expansionary during severe downturns, Mishkin (2009). 
Advocates for exchange rate stability 
The IMF is prominent among today’s clean float advocates for attaining exchange rate stability.  Eg the 
IMF applauded Indonesia in 1997 for deciding to quit exchange rate interventions and to adopt clean 
floating, announcing that this will aid its financial stability.  It also advised Poland to simultaneously: 1) 
make a clean float (in the form of its central bank pursuing exclusively a domestic inflation target); and 2) 
prepare for admission to the EURO.  Admission to the EURO requires that the Polish currency stay 
within  an  extremely  narrow  band  for  an  extended  period,  much  narrower  than  that  historically 
experienced by Poland.  The IMF thus saw such clean floats as ultra stabilizing of exchange rates in the 
late 1990s despite the fact that the East Asian exchange rate liquidity shock of 1997 came in the wake of 
these economies adopting cleaner floats and less regulated markets than before.  Others also advocate 
clean floats as a means of keeping exchange rates more stable, eg for developing countries, Hausken and 
Pluemper (2002), Ramiakrishnan and Zalduendo (2006), for east European countries, Orlowski (2004), 
and for the US itself, Dooroodian and Caporale (2006).  In a similar vein Freedman and Ötker-Robe Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  35 
(2009) deem that developing and east European countries that quit targeting the exchange rate and floated 
cleanly enhanced monetary policy credibility and financial stability. 
 
Control of monetary policy 
Monetary policy can be split between two or three official sectors.  In Australia for instance, there is such 
a three way split, with the central bank, the treasury and the government all with a say.  In the US there is 
a two-way split, with the Treasury in charge of exchange rate interventions, and the Federal Reserve 
Board in charge of the key discount rate.  Actual monetary policy can thus conform to a clean float 
without it being a goal of all authorities involved in official monetary policy.  
 
Practice of a clean float 
The clean float perspective sprang from a desire to get the government out of exchange rate management, 
and indeed to generally minimise its role and role back interfering financial legislation enacted in the 
aftermath of the 1929 US stock market crash and ensuing great depression.  Its heyday was thus the 
heyday of the pro free market movement.  This had gathered strength from the late 1970s, and was 
implemented in most developed countries, including in their exchange rate policies, to a very marked 
degree in the early 1980s by the major currencies on both sides of the Atlantic.  The mixture of rolling 
back or unofficial disregarding the financial regulations enacted in the 1930s was a progressive procedure 
only halted with the onset of the 2007-9 US sub-prime crisis, Telser (2007a, 2007b, 2008), Davidson 
(2009) and Marglin (2009). 
The pre-eminent example of an extreme clean float is that of Paul Volcker’s period as chairman of the US 
Board of Governors that coincided with Donald Regan, a dedicated clean floater, being at the helm for the 
US Treasury, a post that Donald Regan held until 1985. Volcker is widely regarded as the saviour of the 
US economy from the high inflation of the mid 1970s through his persistent control of the US monetary 
base.  Paul Volcker moreover personally avows that he pursued an anti-inflationary goal single-mindedly.  
Some of his critics felt that he should have compromised to alleviate unemployment in the US.  Other 
critics felt that he should have compromised to mitigate the damage imposed on other countries.  See eg 
his retrospective interviews on his Chairmanship of the US Federal Reserve System made to the US 
Public Broadcasting System.  
 
Volcker’s undesired clean float 
This does not however mean that Paul Volcker sees floating exchange rates as a blessing.  It does not 
even mean that he wanted a clean float.  In an interview with Perry Mehrling, Mehrling (2001), Volcker 
elaborates that he would have liked the US to swallow its national pride and depreciate in 1970 (to cope 
with its Vietnam War expenditures) instead of breaking up the Bretton Woods Agreement.  He further 
reports that when he instituted a tight monetary policy to seek to curb domestic inflation, it was not his 
intention that this translated into a clean float policy.  He wished the US Treasury to permit the Federal 
Reserve Board to engage in foreign exchange intervention in order to (partially or wholly) sterilise the 
exchange rate effects of his monetary policy by selling US dollars on the foreign exchange rate market.  Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  36 
The US Treasury however, for years declined to authorise the Federal Reserve Board to intervene in the 
exchange rate market.   
Thus although in the public broadcast, Volcker reports that he felt that in a world of floats, his tight 
monetary policy was the best for the US and the rest of the world, this is not the full story.  He would 
have preferred to keep Bretton Woods, and as a second best, to have a managed float – only the failure to 
attain a managed float prior to 1985 he blames on an uncooperative US Treasury.  In 1985, the pragmatic 
James Baker exchanged posts with Donald Regan and US monetary policy departed from its clean float 
stance, a departure already sought on the other side of the Atlantic. 
Volcker's position that US Treasury intervention could have kept the US dollar steady in the early 1980s 
while he pursued an ultra tight domestic money policy and Reagan pursued an ultra expansionary fiscal 
policy is dubious.  It is especially dubious given that across the Atlantic primarily contractionary fiscal 
policies were pursued, hints at a perspective in which domestic activity and prices are independent of the 
country's  open  economy  linkages.17    Volcker  therefore  seems  in  this  regard  to  be  a  product  of  an 
imperfect transition from closed economy prescriptions to open economy prescriptions.  
However, it might be argued that Volcker has progressed further in seeking to reconcile open economy 
linkages with domestic monetary policy than many academic advocates of clean floats.  He indicates 
inadequate theoretical back-up from his academic colleagues and Federal Reserve Board research staff on 
this topic.  Thus in a panel discussing exchange rates at the American Economic Association meetings in 
New  Orleans,  2001,  he  constantly  challenged  his  academic  co-panelists,  all  enthusiastic  floaters,  to 
explain what was so good about floats.  He reminded them that the associated exchange rate outcomes are 
unpredictable  and  thus  hard  to  connect  to  the  academic  claims  of  floats  being  superior  as  regards 
stabilising exchange rates or anything else.   
In this paper, we take up one aspect of Volcker's challenge.  In taking up that aspect of his challenge, we 
shall offer a quite new modelling of exchange rate determination to those currently available.  Prior to 
offering this new model, we shall introduce additional details concerning Volcker's experience as Chair of 




 DIRTY AND MANAGED FLOAT DETAILS 
A policy of having an official sector alter its exchange is in the postworld war era essentially always 
justified  as  something  beneficial  to  both  affected  currency  blocs.    The  justification  is  restoration  of 
equilibrium that is asserted to benefit both parties. A focus on the US current account being in a Meadian 
disequilibrium deficit underlies the conclusions of Klein (1989, 2005) and Williamson (1994) that earlier 
Japan, and today China, should appreciate against the USD. 18   
                                                 
17  It could be derived from attributing a far bigger impact of the foreign component of the domestic monetary base on the exchange rate than 
has the domestic component of the monetary base, and there is evidence of its being bigger, but so far as the authors know, no estimates 
of its being the requisite amount bigger, nor of Volcker having employed such estimates. 
18  The alternative, non exchange rate procedure for increasing exports above imports is to induce via fiscal policy one’s own country to 
save more and to spend less on domestic consumption and investment.  This alternative procedure is moreover reliable.  Economists 
know a good deal more about how to withdraw funds from an economy so as to contract demand and imports than about how to contract 
imports and stimulate exports by altering the exchange rates.  Indeed depreciations can perversely so increase the import bill that the 
current account worsens. Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  37 
But  most  advocates  of  deliberate  official  sector  changes  in  exchange  rates  focus  on  the  domestic 
unemployment prong of the Meadian concept of joint keeping multiple currencies so as to be able change 
exchange rates focus on situations of underemployment in a particular country.19  These advocates argue 
that restoration of full employment and equilibrium can be attained by that country depreciating, or the 
partner country appreciating.  The academic strand of this literature applies Mundell (1961) to particular 
sorts of shocks in the wake of a rise in domestic unemployment.  The US and the EU were strident 
advocates  for  Japan  appreciating  on  the  unemployment  ground  into  the  later  1980s,  and  have  been 
likewise strident advocates for China to appreciate over most of the last decade.  
Advocates of managed floating to stabilise exchange rates either dispute the validity of the Meadian pair 
of equilibrium concepts or else ignore them.  Keynes switched from advocating that the UK depreciate by 
going off gold in the later 1920s so as to reduce UK unemployment, to advocating stable exchange rates 
in the later 1930s after witnessing the uncertainty generated by beggar-thy-neighbour depreciations of 
successive countries.  In the early 1940s he proposed a world central bank with more powers than the 
current IMF.  Support for managed floats with marked intervention to maintain exchange rate pegs has 
continued to attract supporters, eg Calvo (2000), Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Courchene (1999a, 1999b) 
and Courchene and Harris (1999) and Wyplosz (2006).  In a like spirit, Charles Bean, Executive Director 
and  Chief  Economist  at  the  Bank  of  England,  in  2001  at  the  Royal  Economic  society  conference 
criticized the European Central Bank for not choosing to use its obviously available intervention powers 
to intervene and stabilize the EURO, Islam (2001).  
Into the 1990s, numerous developing countries floated very dirtily to try to stabilise their exchange rates.  
This  is  seen  as  a  wise  policy  given  how  international  debts  can  become  unmanageable  after  a 
depreciation, Eichengreen (2001).  But developing countries sometimes became cleaner under pressure 
from the IMF and the Washington Consensus to liberalise their capital markets.20   
Clear-cut examples of countries with very managed floats to stabilise their exchange rates today are Japan 
and China.  Another clear-cut example of a managed float amongst themselves was the decision to seek a 
European Monetary system in 1979, one that in steps led to 12 European countries joining currencies and 
adopting the EURO two decades later with a single currency operated under the European Central Bank.  
In  a  similar  vein  other  countries  have  taken  the  extreme  of  exchange  rate  intervention  to  stabilize 




BEGGAR-THY-NEIGHBOUR MANAGED FLOATS VIA MUNDELL (1961) 
Beggar-thy-neighbour managed floats were commonplace in the 1930s.  A country depreciated to seek to 
solve one's unemployment problem in the hope that this would boost exports and aid import competing 
industries.  Often soon after another country retaliated with a depreciation.  In due course countries 
                                                 
19   On the beggar-thy-neighbour bias in how the Meadian concept of equilibrium is in practice applied by advocates of exchange rate 
changes, see Appendix 3 and Pope (2008). 
20  Reservations  on  this  pressure  have  been  expressed,  eg  Polanski  (2000)  and  Stiglitz  (2002).    Another  study,  while  not  estimating 
separately the exchange rate component of the IMF raft of conditions, finds that obtaining IMF help with its attendant conditions, is 
damaging to an economy, namely Barro and Lee (2005).  Yet other studies conclude that the impact of exchange rate regime on 
exchange rate stability is ambiguous or country-specific, eg von Hagen and Zhou (2007). Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  38 
decided that a preferable exchange rate regime was the Bretton Woods Agreement.  Mundell (1961) 
attributes the horrors of the 1930s to the failure to quickly enough make the Bretton Woods agreement 
and  remove  floating  exchange  rates  and  beggar-thy-neighbour  competitive  depreciations.    He  never 
advocated the managed floats proposed by scientists who refer to his 1961 model.  He rightly complains 
that he distanced himself from them in that article, not merely in his consistent advocacy since of a single 
world money.  He objects to the persistent misinterpretation of his 1961 article by those advocating 
floating  exchange  rates.    He  advocates  a  single  money  simply  on  the  grounds  that  this  will  reduce 
transactions costs, eg Mundell (2003).   
As Mundell has complained, many use Mundell (1961) to ascertain optimal currency areas.  All such 
usages in practice amount to advocating the beggar-thy-neighbour managed floats of the 1930s.  To 
scientists  employing  Mundell  (1961)  and  extensions  thereof,  this  may  be  surprising.    We  therefore 
explain  un-noticed  features  of  that  model  –  how  its  denial  of  the  complexity,  uncertainty,  and  risk 
experienced in the real world enables this.  Later in Part 4 we shall see how in general, not merely in 
Mundell (1961) that denial of complexity, uncertainty and risk seems natural under our standard expected 
utility theory lens, and deflects our attention away from uncertainty effects experienced in real time. 
Certainty despite a Mundell shock 
In the Mundell (1961) set-up, there is a once for all shock, never to be repeated, and nobody ever expects 
another shock.  Ie everybody believes in certainty, always did before the shock, and always does after.  
This, to put it mildly, is a dubious assumption for deciders being even half way rational.  But then, often 
deciders are irrational, or at least myopic and unduly inward looking.  For instance, it did take countries 
in the 1930s a while to discover that other countries would retaliate and that instead of a certain future, 
exchange rates were exceedingly uncertain and unpredictable.   
However, it is dubious to propose that in reality as distinct from theory, a country can use the Mundell 
(1961) solution more than once.  A repeat Mundell (1961) solution requires both countries and all those 
other countries dealing with them to be rather more myopic and non-anticipatory than is the norm.  We 
notice that exchange rate dealers often sharply increase the country risk premium after an unexpected 
depreciation.  The increase in country risk premium can plausibly be interpreted as a realisation that the 
country's exchange rate is uncertain, something excluded under the Mundell (1961) model's reliance on 
certainty.  This  in  turn  excludes  repeated  use  of  the  Mundell  (1961)  model  within  the  period  before 
forgetting occurs as regards risk premia, and people get lulled into seeing the future as certain.  See Allais 
(1972) and Blatt (1983) for evidence on how long is required for such forgetfulness.  Yet scientists 
employing the Mundell (1961) model to investigate advantages and disadvantages of a currency union, to 
the authors' knowledge, fail to comment on this matter.  Ie they fail to take into account that a country 
could only ever use the exchange rate once – without the model's assumption of certainty becoming 
altogether implausible, and its implications correspondingly false. 
The model's assumption of certainty before and after the single shock moreover excludes all possibilities 
of  anyone  being  ignorant  about  the  type  of  shock  and  its  consequences.    This  assumption  of  full 
knowledge about the shock's type and the shock's consequences has misled economists in their analysis 
and policy advice concerning exchange rate regime as shown in section 2.a.2 below. 
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Certainty in attaining instantly the new equilibrium 
In  Mundell  (1961)  everybody  in  both  countries  understands  where,  after  the  shock,  is  the  new 
equilibrium.  Everyone understands that it is good (with rigid nominal wages) for one of the two countries 
to depreciate to restore the international level of competitiveness after a special sort of shock.  Thus there 
is no scope for retaliation.  Everybody agrees that the single never-to-be repeated exchange rate change is 
beneficial to both countries and will be instantly implemented.  There could not be a case of the country 
that has appreciated protesting that now its wages are too high, and that as a consequence it is suffering 
unemployment, losses in export markets and in import competing markets.   
In this Mundell (1961) world, no country would ever need to risk being accused of beggar-thy-neighbour 
activity in lobbying another country to appreciate or in itself depreciating.  In this Mundell (1961) world 
as in reality, there is an adding up accounting identity.  After a shock, each pair of countries recognises 
and readily agrees whether it is the sort of shock where one country should appreciate, and the other 
depreciate. 
 
Systematic bias in discerning the new equilibrium 
Let  us  now  contrast  this  academic  exercise  –  in  which  the  accounting  identity  holds  –  with  what 
economists tell an actual country to do in an actual situation.  The authors have been unable to identify 
any country other than Singapore that has a body of economists writing in academic journals or advising 
the government, seeking to have that country's wage level raised because it is excessively competitive in 
the  international  arena.    Instead  the  authors  find  economists  advising  virtually  every  land  that  their 
country's unemployment woes arise via too high wages.   
The notion that, apart from Singapore, every country has suffered a special sort of shock that might be 
aided by a depreciation is thus untenable.  It violates accounting identities.  The fair Mundell (1961) 
model translates in the complexity of the real world into a beggar-thy-neighbour managed float policy.  
The complexity of the real world generates uncertainty on just where is equilibrium and just what sorts of 
shocks have occurred. 
Thus US economists see a solution to its jobless private sector recovery from China appreciating, and 
estimate the trade gains from a Renminbi appreciation.  They seem quite promising, Thorbecke (2006).  
For its part, China seeks to avoid this appreciation as far as is feasible, given its massive unemployment 
problems.    Economists  concerned  for  poor  China,  worry  that  it  could  follow  Japan  into  long-term 
recession if it yields substantially to US pressure to appreciate, McKinnon (2005).  In practice, therefore, 
in the murky world where nobody knows where the equilibrium is and has only a vague notion of what 
sort of shocks have occurred, against his wishes, the model of Mundell (1961) is used as a justification 
for  beggar-thy-neighbour  procedures.    The  econometric  exercises  conducted  in  that  vast  branch  of 
research on optimal currency areas, have served as inadvertent buttresses for anti-social behaviour.  In 
practical policy, this massive branch of econometric literature has not merely been futile.  It has been 
counterproductive in furnishing unwitting support for biased exchange rate interventions in the name of 
speeding attainment of equilibria.  For further details, see Pope (2008). 
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Appendix 4 
ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH RISK EFFECTS EXPERIENCED IN CHRONOLOGICAL TIME WITHIN EUT 
The coincidence attempt 
Friedman  and  Savage  (1948)  argued  that  although  the  choices  made  under  EUT  ignore  risk  effects 
experienced in chronological time, the decisions made under EUT could coincide with those proposed by 
the older asset theory (in which variance and other measures of dispersion, ie of risk, were included) – if 
EUT choosers have concave "as if certain" utility functions.  They criticised Marschak for not recognising 
this.  Marschak (1950) accepted the criticism, converted to EUT and introduced the following confusing 
new terminology, taken up in the Arrow-Pratt measures.  Ie what is called "risk attitude" in EUT is 
whether: 
(i)  the as if certain utility function is linear, so called "risk neutral",   
(ii)  the as if certain utility function is concave, so called "risk averse", and            
(iii) the as if certain utility function is convex, so called "risk loving". 
But by the late 1950s it had become more widely known that Friedman and Savage and Marschak were 
mistaken about the scope of EUT to coincide in its decisions with mean variance models.  Borch (1969) 
and Feldstein (1969) reported that the conditions required for EUT to coincide with a mean variance 
model are rarely satisfied.  Further Schneeweiß (1968a, 1969b, (1972a, 1973b) proved that the conditions 
in Borch and Feldstein were too weak to attain the coincidence.   
Another restriction that does enable EUT to coincide with mean variance models was discovered later.  
This is if choices concern assets – and the asset market is complete and perfect.  But even the financial 
section of the asset market is far from perfect and far from complete.  The coincidence route thus fails to 
enable EUT to accidentally choose as would a reasonable theory of choice under risk that includes risk 
effects experienced in chronological time. 
 
The elaborated outcomes attempt 
Other ways for EUT to include risk effects experienced in chronological time date back to the early 
1950s.  One is the proposal to specify the decision situation more fully or to redefine or elaborate the 
outcomes,  eg  Samuelson  (1952),  Markowitz  (1959,  1991)  and  Caplin  and  Leahy  (2001).    But  these 
elaborations destroy EUT’s axiomatic base and preclude the derivation of its representation theorem in 
the usual sense, Pope (2000).   
The temporal EUT attempt 
Initially the concern had been about omitted emotional chronological time effects that EUT omits.  But by 
the mid 1950s, it was realised that there were also financial chronological time risk effects that EUT 
omits.  Initially proposals were along the lines of specifying the decision situation more fully.  But in due 
course – since planning involves multiple time periods and an outcome flow with multiple outcome 
segments  –  it  was  realised  that  atemporal  EUT  could  not  include  these.    Work  commenced  on 
constructing new temporal EUT axioms, eg Kreps and Porteus (1978), Caplin and Leahy (2001) and 
Klibanoff  and  Oxdenoren  (2006).    The  problem  is  that  an  EUT  axiomatisation  has  to  derive  the 
mechanical atemporal probability weighting rule.  In order to derive it a compound gamble (a mixing) 
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known simultaneously, at the same time.  But such a simultaneity postulate contradicts the sequential 
nature of compound probabilities, Pope (1985).  Any such simultaneity postulate precludes getting a non-
contradictory  set  of  axioms  detailing  the  actual  delays  that  precede  resolution  of  risk,  and  blurs  the 
distinction between real time risk effects that must enter the satisfactions (utility) mapping with atemporal 
aggregation effects that are outside time.  Such a false simultaneity postulate precludes understanding the 
distinction between the chooser's anticipated possible cause effect chains of an act, and how the chooser 
integrates (aggregates) these into a single value of an act.  In the case of temporal EUT, it generates a 
situation in which sequential risks are assumed to be sequential – with positive delays before being 





Primary and secondary satisfactions 
It  was  partly  to  help  alleviate  confusions  on  what  satisfactions  EUT  excludes,  that  Pope  (2001) 
introduced the terminology of secondary satisfactions, and its counterpart, primary satisfactions.  Choice 
between alternatives depends on future satisfactions – future real time experiences– as anticipated at the 
time of choice.  Primary satisfactions can be positive or negative (dissatisfactions).  They stem from 
knowledge-ahead-independent sources of satisfactions as anticipated at the time of choice, ie satisfactions 
reaped from the current outcome segment that are independent of having known ahead what this outcome 
segment would be.  Primary satisfactions from the outcome segment, occurring after all conceivable risk 
is past, are included in EUT.  If as EUT and most non-EUT theories do, we limit ourselves to: 
(i)  the sub-set of primary satisfactions that will be reaped after all risk is past, 
(ii)  cases where the utility scale and post risk outcomes are both inherently univariate – not with 
irreducible multiple dimensions,  
then utility is itself univariate and can be mapped in a plane against the post-risk outcome segment.  The 
utility shape is concave if there is diminishing marginal utility from primary satisfactions, linear if there is 
linear marginal utility from primary satisfactions, and convex if there is increasing marginal utility from 
primary satisfactions, as in Friedman and Savage (1948) diagrams.
21   
Secondary  satisfactions  are  the  counterpart  to  primary  satisfactions,  the  complementary  class  of 
satisfactions from primary ones.  Secondary satisfactions can be positive or negative.  They stem from 
knowledge-ahead-based sources of satisfactions as anticipated at the time of choice.  They are termed 
secondary since they derive from primary satisfactions, not because they are necessarily less important.  
Often they are more important.  Since in the case of secondary satisfactions, utility derives from its 
riskiness or certainty, it is infeasible to trace out the secondary satisfactions function on a plane with 
outcomes on the other axis.  Multiple other dimensions (axes) will in general be needed to capture the 
various aspects of risk whose bound at one end is certainty. 
                                                 
21  In that paper, primary satisfactions are what Friedman and Savage term the EUT utilities, being unaware that there might be certainty 
effects captured by their version of EUT, and recognizing that EUT excludes from its utilities sources of satisfactions based on a limited 
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Secondary satisfactions stemming from a limited degree of knowledge ahead destroy the axiomatic base 
of EUT, and most non-EUT theories.  Whether secondary satisfactions stemming from certainty – full 
knowledge ahead – are excluded from EUT, depends on the version of EUT.  These are excluded under 
the Ramsey version, included (also illusory ones) under the Friedman and Savage version, Pope (2004). 
One example of a negative material secondary satisfaction is the planning inefficiency of a central bank 
not knowing whether its attempt to hold out against speculators will succeed.  If it knew it would fail it 
would not waste any taxpayer dollars in interventions on the exchange rate market seeking to defend its 
currency.  If it knew it would succeed, it would not damage its economy by raising interest rates or in 
other ways restricting domestic credit.  It is its limited degree of knowledge ahead of whether it will 
succeed that results in its "half-way" measures because it does not know what will ensue and thus must 
inefficiently invest with a bet each way. 
Another example of a material negative secondary satisfaction is that from a loan and its associated risk 
premia.  This is a secondary satisfaction since the loan size and its repayment cost inclusive or any risk 
premium  interest  surcharge  depends  on  degree  of  knowledge  ahead  –  namely  the  probability  of 
repayment.  Exchange rate depreciation risk for the borrower's domestic currency adds to these negative 
secondary satisfactions for the borrower by increasing a) the risk of default and thus risk premium, and b) 
the repayment liability if solvent. 
An example of a mixed emotional and material secondary satisfaction is blame when a risk turns out 
badly.    Its  emotional  component  is  the  affect.    Its  financial  component  is  the  loss  of  income  or 
promotional prospects in the case of official sector executives moved sideways or with their powers 
relegated to another branch. 
SKAT from the point of choice 
Let all the risk be completely resolved at a time in the future that the chooser, a central bank, knows 
exactly at the time of choice time t=0.  Then its future at time t=0 contains just two stages of knowledge 
ahead,  just  two  epistemic  periods,  one  pre-outcome  period  (before  it  learns  the  final  segment  of  its 
outcome flow), and one post-outcome period, when it will have learned this final segment of his outcome 
flow.  The SKAT decision maker takes into account primary satisfactions P1h, h = 1, … H and secondary 
satisfactions S1j, j = 1, … J anticipated in period 1, the pre-outcome period, and primary satisfactions P2mi, 
m = 1, … M and secondary satisfactions S2ni, n = 1, …N anticipated in period 2, the post-outcome period 
if outcome segment i occurs, i = 1, ... I.  See Figure A3.a and Table A3.a. 
 
Figure A3.a 
The Anticipated Cause-Effect Chains from Choosing an Alternative 
 
period 1, the pre-outcome period  P11 and ... P1H  and S11 and ... S1J   
period 2, the post-outcome period 
                         
... 
   
 
either  P211 and ... P21M and S211 and ... S21N  or ... or  P2I1 and ... P2IM and S2I1 and ... S2IN   
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qualitatively.
  This is because normally the aggregation, like the satisfactions themselves, is of a qualitative 
form, and follows algorithmic procedures of sequentially considering sources of satisfactions, often with a 
satisficing component, choosing an alternative when it yields enough satisfaction.  It is however, easier to 
see the fundamental difference between SKAT and EUT via Table A3.a.  Here we unrealistically impute to 
our  SKAT  central  bank  numerical  satisfactions  and  weights  (for  linearly  separable  satisfactions)  and  a 
probability to each possible outcome and use of these probabilities as his atemporal weights for aggregating 
these mutually exclusive outcomes to form its overall value of an alternative.  Table A3.a thereby highlights 
the three sets of satisfactions that EUT omits – even in the case of and numerical probability weights for the 
atemporal  aggregation  of  the  mutually  excusive  satisfactions.    These  three  omitted  sets  are:  primary 
satisfactions in the pre-outcome period, secondary satisfactions in the pre-outcome period, and secondary 
satisfactions in the post-outcome period. 
 
Appendix 6 
6  ILLUSTRATING SKAT  
Here, let us illustrate SKAT with the minimum four epistemic (knowledge) stages that a chooser could 
encounter after discerning a problem meriting a decision.  Let our illustration be France's central bank in 
July 1993 upon discovery of a speculative attack on the French franc, an attack whose cause remains to 
this day controversial.  We draw on accounts of this historical episode in Eichengreen and Wyplosz 
(1993) and Melitz (1994), information kindly furnished by Massmo Warglien on Italy's exchange rate 
crisis  experience  the  year  before,  and  of  the  UK  exchange  rate  experience  in  the  preceding  year  in 
Cobham (2001). Despite using these accounts, our illustration is fictional, partly since it is so exceedingly 
simplified,  and  partly  since  it  is  designed  to  illustrate  SKAT  and  general  issues  in  exchange  rate 
determination. 
Whiles fictional in its specific details, some general aspects of our account are factual.  We shall draw 
attention to some of these factual general aspects when commenting afterwards on the four stages, and 
again when presenting our model of exchange rate determination in Part 6.  This illustration helps explain 
why  we  have  decided  to  differ  so  radically  from  other  exchange  rate  determination  models  in  the 
following respects. 
1  Central bank cooperation or conflict is key to exchange rates. 
2  The norm, apart from the early to mid 1980s, is for central banks to have multiple goals.   
3  There is a limited circle of people whose decisions have a major impact on an exchange rate, most of 
who are in the official sector, and amongst whom are personalities, friendships (or enmities) whose 
idiosyncracies may be decisive. 
4  The decision process is primarily qualitative, with no resemblance to the maximisations assumed in 
theoretical derivations of a central bank reaction function. 
 
Stage 1.1 
On facing an unexpected attack on the franc, the Banque must discover available alternatives since it is 
ignorant of its choice set.  Suppose it discovered that it could: raise interest rates; or depreciate at once; or 
try to ride out the crisis.   Then the Banque has had a change in its knowledge ahead.  The Bank knows its 
choice set.  It has entered the second part of stage 1, stage 1.2.   Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  45 
Stage 1.2 
Its task now is to evaluate these three alternatives, work out which are safe alternatives (with a single 
known outcome if chosen), and which risky, with more than one possible outcome, and the details of each 
alternative  –  vaguely  posed  initially.    How  it  makes  the  more  precise,  the  preliminary  step  in  the 
evaluation process, stems from its goals.   
Its 7 goals 
First, there is the goal of becoming part of the EURO bloc.  The Maastricht Treaty required exchange 
rates of EU members entering the EURO bloc to keep within a narrow band.  A sizable depreciation 
would breach this treaty requirement.  Both key French political parties want France in the EURO, and so 
for  this  reason  are  against  much  of  a  depreciation  against  Germany.    Those  French  firms  that  have 
borrowed in DM on the assumption of a pretty steady exchange rate, and will suffer a sizable increase in 
indebtedness  if  their  trust  in  the  exchange  rate's  steadiness  proves  to  have  been  misplaced.    The 
government and the Banque are also against much of a depreciation in order to maintain French pride.  
France  had  joined  forces  with  the  UK  back  in  1989  against  Germany's  central  bank's  request  to  be 
allowed to markedly appreciate against other countries planning to enter the EURO bloc.  The national 
pride of the French in a strong franc and the like desire of the UK to have a strong pound had (under the 
rules of an earlier treaty) allowed these two countries to stop Germany from undertaking its desired 
appreciation  to  cope  with  the  inflationary  pressures  arising  out  of  the  integration  of  east  Germany.  
Already the UK looked foolish, having in 1992 felt forced to stop defending the pound on the "Black 
Wednesday" of September 1992, and as a consequence having had to quit being in the formal EURO 
entry process.  
There are the Banque's set of roughly six other goals – the matters of 1) prices and inflation low and 2) 
prices and inflation as forecast, 3) maintaining international competitiveness, 4) keeping interest rates 
appropriate, 5) keeping employment at a good level, and 6) pleasing the main political parties.  At the 
time of the attack, competitiveness does not indicate a depreciation, and inflation does not indicate an 
interest rate rise.  Indeed the low level of inflation and the sorry state of employment indicates an interest 
rate drop – and so does the forthcoming election. 
 
The safe alternatives of a big interest rate hike or depreciation  
The Banque considers alternative a), raising interest rate.  It concludes that this would need to be sizable 
to keep the Franc from depreciating below its EURO entry specified lower band, but if sizable, safe.  Ie, a 
sizable interest rate hike would be guaranteed to avoid the franc going outside the agreed exchange rate 
band  and  so  guaranteed  to  keep  France  in  the  EMS  and  thus  also  essentially  without  any  of  the 
undesirable and disruptive wealth redistribution that would accompany a sizable exchange rate change of 
depreciating below the treaty agreed lower band limit.  The Banque considers the distress to the country 
of a tight money policy when the country is already in depression and the opposition it would have to 
shoulder from political parties – especially as elections were nearing, and there is no need for a higher 
interest rate as regards international competitiveness or inflationary forecasts or targets.   
The Banque next considers alternative b), the distress to key political parties of an immediate sizable 
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pressure.    But  it  would  force  France's  exit  from  the  EMS,  and  both  the  main  political  parties  have 
endorsed entering the EURO bloc.   
The risky alternative of seeking to ride out the crisis 
Finally, the Banque considers its third alternative, seeking to ride out the crisis.  It realises that this has no 
guaranteed outcome.  It considers the downside risk.  Failure implies a massive loss of taxpayers' funds 
plunged in the effort of holding the French franc in the EMS band.  It considers the costs of failure to be 
worse than those of the UK when it had failed nearly a year earlier after attempting to ride out its 
exchange rate crisis and had been forced out of the EMS.  It considers that the cost of failure would be 
similar to those of the Italian central bank that had also about a year earlier tried to ride out a crisis over 
an even longer period and yet failed.  The Banca d'Italia had by the time it failed, lost essentially all the 
official sector's foreign reserves, had a massive depreciation and exit from the EMS.  There were such 
drastic debt repercussions for the public sector that government had taken 6% or so of every Italian bank 
account to bring its public debt back to a manageable level.22   
The Banque considers the chance of success for itself, considering what differentiates France from the 
UK and Italian failures.  It feels it has a better chance to persuade Erminger, the head of Germany's 
central bank to intervene enough on its behalf.  Erminger sees France as a well-behaved nation in having 
a lower inflation rate than Germany itself.  He has already twice come to her aid in the last year in two 
other  speculative  attacks,  and  the  German  federal  government  is  dedicated  to  keeping  France  in  the 
EURO.  The Banque also thinks that even if it does not get sufficient cooperation from Germany's central 
bank to avoid a depreciation below the amount permitted under the Maastricht Treaty, that France is such 
an important country for Germany to keep in the EMS, that the treaty terms might be softened so that 
France does not have to forfeit EMS membership.  However, getting the treaty terms softened would 
require time, so that pursuing this option would involve attempting to ride out the crisis.  The Banque 
realises that it could have: 1, huge luck – no depreciation and no need to keep highish interest rates after 
to deter a fourth speculative attack; or 2, modest luck, with a bit of a depreciation pushing it below the 
currently  permitted  EMS  band,  but  that  band  being  widened  to  keep  it  in  the  EMS  and  this  being 
maintainable with continuing highish interest rates; or a disaster.   
Suppose the Banque decided to try to ride the crisis out.  This is because it hopes for more cooperation 
than the German central bank offered the UK and Italy in their crises nearly a year earlier and enough 
German federal government support to get the treaty changed if need be.  Ie the Banque hopes to get at 
least the modest luck outcome.23  Then the Banque has had a second change in its knowledge ahead.  It 




                                                 
22 The "plunder" just might have been rough justice if bank accounts of the speculators had been swelled by the speculative gains, ie falling 
more heavily on these than those who had not speculated and thus had not such large accounts in the aftermath.  This raises an interesting 
issue of a new instrument, that if it had BIS cooperation and WTO endorsement, might enable governments to differentially tax holders of 
their currency, eg choosing to levy taxes on such holdings only after undesired depreciations of their currencies. 
23  Ie the Banque has decided it may have more luck than the Bank of England a year earlier when it had to deal with a speculative attack on 
the pound, and sought rather than tight money in a severe recession to dare that Germany would avert a depreciation and avert its forced 
exit the process planned to lead into the EURO.  That dare that failed as Germany did not offer enough cooperation.  The vain attempt to 
avoid a severe depreciation failed, costing UK taxpayers billions, and the UK exited from its government's desire to stay in the process 
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Stage 2 
The Banque now waits to learn if it has luck.  It does not get enough cooperation from Germany's central 
bank to avoid a drop in the value of the French franc.  But it does get enough cooperation that the drop 
was not catastrophic and it has the luck of being permitted nevertheless to remain in the process planned 
to lead into the EURO.  This is because its lobbying succeeded in getting the EMS band (within which 
exchange rates must stay) widened.  It is in the modest luck category only, having to maintain highish 
interest rates despite its recessed economy as speculators did get a bit of a reward, and in this sense have 
saddled  France  (because  of  its  modest  depreciation)  with  a  modest  increment  in  the  country's  risk 
premium.24  Then it has had a third change in its knowledge ahead.  It knows the final segment of this 
outcome flow.   
Stage 3 and summary 
The Banque has full knowledge ahead – certainty of the middling success from its decision – and the 
fallout of some loss of taxpayers' funds and asset redistribution both within France and between France 
and the rest of the world, plus the fallout of a risk premium to be born into the future of higher interest 
rates than otherwise for an extended period.  Table A4 summarises the four stages through which the 




The Banque's Four Main Stages of Knowledge Ahead After Encountering a Crisis 
 
Stage / Period 
Outcome Segment 
Activity  Unknown 
1.1 Pre-Choice set  Discovering Alternatives  Choice set 
1.2 Pre Choice  Evaluating Alternatives 
a)  safe option – raise interest rates; or  
b)  safe option – depreciate and exit the EMS; or  
c)  risky option – try to ride out the crisis with 
three  possible  outcomes:  1,  failure  or;  2, 
modest luck; or 3 huge luck  
Chosen alternative 
2 Pre-outcome*  Waiting to learn its luck with choice of c)  Last Outcome Segment 
3 Post-Outcome  Living with modest luck under its choice of c)  Nothing  –  full 
knowledge  ahead, 
certainty  
* Irrelevant, as of zero duration, if the Banque had chosen sure alternative a) or b) 
 
Literature 
                                                 
24  It could have avoided this by choosing its safe but disagreeable policy – especially disagreeable as preceding elections – of a substantial 
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For stage 1 there are the satisficing and aspiration-adaptation models, Simon (1955), Sauermann and 
Selten (1962), Selten (1998).  There are also critiques of central bankers, arguing that they at times failed 
to search broadly enough for alternatives, and thus sometimes ended up with a bad decision simply 
because they failed to notice a good alternative and thus did not include it in the choice set.  As regards 
the UK official sector (where power for interest rates resides with the Bank of England, eg, Cobham 
(2002a, 2002b). 
For stage 2 there is literature on the difficulties in performing such evaluations, Janis and Mann (1977). 
This research allows us to understand the difficulties of economists described in Part 2 trying to evaluate 
under real world complexity where is equilibrium within a Mundell (1961) frame.  Nearly all economists 
conclude  that  nearly  every  country  in  the  world  would  be  more  in  equilibrium  with  a  depreciation, 
implying that at least half misevaluate.  Work on the heuristics used in stage 2 include Cyert and March 
(1963), Huber (1982), Montgomery and Svenson (1983), Weber and Borcherding (1993), Brandstaetter, 
Gigerenzer and Hertwig (2006), Pope, Leitner and Leopold-Wildburger (2006, chapter 14, 2009).  In the 
exchange rate context, work on the heuristics of real exchange rates as a short cut to tracing the effects of 
the multiple prices in and economy, have been conducted by two of the authors as discussed in Part 3, 
work showing that these real exchange rate heuristics yield conclusions concerning exchange rate effects 
that, for some countries, are the reverse of the actual effects. 
There  is  for  stage  3,  literature  on  secondary  satisfactions  (on  uncertainty  effects  anticipated  to  be 
experienced in chronological time) includes the effects of uncertainty on firms engaged in investment as 
distinct from production delineated in Keynes (1936), as noted in Walsh (1996, pp. 56, 62-66), and in 
effect extended in Pope (1983, 2004, 2005).  In the case of the Banque, the costs of this uncertainty (the 
negative secondary satisfactions) are the higher than otherwise interest levels and shortage of funds of its 
stakeholders (through some of them speculating against the French franc). 
For stage 4, there is a literature from standard decision models on primary satisfactions.  For stage 3 there 
is also a literature from non-standard decision models that consider secondary satisfactions in the form of 
risk and uncertainty effects from the legacies of the preceding decision stages.  One such legacy of prior 
risk  is  disappointment  that  the  previously  possible  better  final  outcome  segment  did  not  occur,  Bell 
(1981).  In this regard the Banque will have been disappointed as it had successfully defended two prior 
attacks without virtually no depreciation, but thankful that the outcome was not more dire.   
Another such legacy of prior risk is being fired when others discover in stage 4 that in stage 1 the CEO 
had chosen the wrong act of rejecting the Norwegian government's offer of what later proved to be the 
most lucrative north sea oil field, Hagen (1985).  In this respect the Banque did not suffer as much 
criticism as might have ensued had the depreciation forced it out of the EMS process planned to lead into 
the EURO.  
A third such legacy of prior risk in stage 4 is having to repay more interest because of the risk endured in 
stage  3  by  the  lender  involved  a  risk  premium  interest  surcharge,  Pope  (2005).    In  this  respect  the 
Banque's stakeholders faced less of an increase in risk premia than if France had been forced to exit he 
process leading to the EURO.  Still the Banque had to shoulder the unpleasant legacy of many of its 
stakeholders  suffering  a  difficult  hike  in  their  non-Franc  denominated  debt  repayments  out  of  this 
unanticipated and moderately successful speculative attack on the currency – an attack that even with Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  49 
hindsight was puzzling economists afterwards, Mélitz  (1994).  It knows moreover that it will suffer for 
an extended period from having to subject its stakeholders to higher than otherwise interest rates to 
ensure that there will not be another speculative attack. 
 
Appendix 7 
OFFICIAL SECTOR LEARNING AND FORGETTING ABOUT EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES 
Empirical work requires an exchange rate regime to operate for long enough under one regime, and then 
for long enough under another, with other important causal factors held constant, or controllable, for us to 
discern the difference (if any) that the two regimes make to exchange rate stability.  For instance, suppose 
we  wanted  to  measure  the  effect  on  exchange  rate  stability  of  Volcker's  clean  float  regime  versus 
Greenspan's multiple-goal-influenced exchange rate regime.  Then for the US we have around 20 years of 
data, or somewhat less after we allow for some lags.  We have actually far less data, since we need to 
subtract degrees of freedom for every other causal factor that was operating, and whose values changed 
over the period, such as various sorts of shocks and gradual predictable structural changes.   
We  also  need  to  get  corresponding  data  for  other  countries  since  an  exchange  rate  involves  two 
currencies.  Ie, we need a set of partner currencies, or at least one single partner currency for the US that 
had exchange rate regimes that changed at roughly the same time.  Otherwise we get mixed results from 
one partner having a clean float and the other not, and our econometric estimation becomes infeasible.  
Such correspondence held roughly for a few years in the early 1980s when clean floats were especially 
widespread.   
But by the mid 1980s, most countries had the horror of a roughly halving of currencies against the US 
dollar in which all their roll-over debts were denominated, and a roughly doubling of world wide interest 
rates,  leading  to  a  fourfold  increase  in  their  roll-over  international  debt,  virtually  all  of  which  was 
unhedged and denominated in US dollars.  No country, not even any rich one, could escape noticing 
drastic disadvantages in the clean float policy.  As reported in Part 7, Germany switched to a managed 
float – intervened on the exchange rate market to try to bring down the US dollar, and Margaret Thatcher 
intervened via a discussion with Ronald Reagan to bring it down.   
What this amounts to is that the exchange rate regime keeps changing as the official sector discovers 
problems  with  whatever  regime  it  has  adopted.    This  learning  causing  a  regime  change  thwarts 
econometric estimation.  Econometric estimation needs the regime constant across a pair of countries 
long enough to estimate the effect of that regime. 
It might be thought that this is an isolated instance of being unable to match up regimes in two currencies.  
It might be thought that we can choose another air of decades in the post-Bretton Woods era, or another 
pair of countries even for the 1980s and since, that offer alternated symmetric regimes for long enough to 
perform the econometric estimation.  Such however is not the case.  While there are world-wide trends of 
learning and forgetting about the disadvantages and advantages of each sort of exchange rate regimes, 
constellations  of  factors  relating  to  the  particular  countries  and  the  personalities  involved,  create 
discrepancies in when major regime changes are adopted, and how much there is of change in the actual 
regime from quarter to quarter. Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  50 
The mirror image of the reports of central bankers that they face unpredicted and unwanted exchange rate 
changes, not merely in the early 1970s but today, is that they are ever trying to learn, but not making 
systematic progress in learning about exchange rate movements.  Somewhat similar comments hold as 
regards the impact of monetary policy on prices, above all in the short to medium term.  As Friedman 
(1969) had discovered, the lags are long and variable.  His discoveries of these long and variable lags are 
not something that can be estimated econometrically in the least reliably using quarterly data, the norm in 
econometric models devised to advise central bankers operating clean floats.  Econometric estimates 
require constancy of coefficients for each lag.  There has been learning and forgetting over the decades on 
the length and unreliability of these lags. 
All this means that even if we could discover a pair of countries with matched clean float  exchange rate 
regimes sequelled or preceded by matched managed float regimes, how each country implemented each 
regime would tend to keep on changing, and not changing in a synchronised way.  In this regard, it might 
be  no  difficulty  for  econometric  estimation  if  such  learning  –  and  its  counterpart  of  individual  and 
institutional  forgetting  –  has  a  steady  pattern  as  in  some  theoretical  models  of  x%  learned  and  y% 
forgotten per period of some univariate instrument applied to some univariate goal.  Such however is 
false.      Official  sectors  have  multiple  instruments  of  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policy,  multiple 
objectives of managed floats, and the learning and forgetting is of an episodic nature, with indeed no 
readily discernible systematic trend toward enhanced knowledge.  A world of floating exchange rates 
renders this too complex for official sectors who hire us economists – mirroring we economists' own 
failure to master the fundamentals of the exchange rate. Below we trace a couple of episodes of the 
learning  and  forgetting  of  the  post  Bretton  Woods  era  to  underline  the  daunting  task  of  using 
econometrics that requires constancy to analyse exchange rate regime effects on exchange rate stability. 
Consider intervention techniques.  When floats began in the early 1970s and since, some official sectors 
deemed  that  exchange  rates  were  exclusively  demand  driven  and  this  continued  into  the  1980s.  
Australia’s deregulation of the exchange rate was orchestrated and administered under such an extreme 
neo-Keynesian viewpoint!  
Others, of the monetary school, thought that any expansion of a country’s high powered money base 
would have like effects on its exchange rate.  They thought that selling off some of its domestic debt 
component to shrink the monetary base would be identical to selling off some of its foreign reserves.  
That after all is how monetary models depicted it.  Any change in the monetary base shrinks domestic 
money  and  thus  should  have  a  like  effect  of  raising  the  currency's  value.    Such  neutrality,  it  was 
concluded, is far from the case both as regards speed of impact and overall impact.  Foreign exchange 
interventions operate far faster, and arguably more powerfully than do operations on the domestic base.  
This altered management of both clean and managed floats in some countries.  The learning about this 
however  is  far  from  systematic,  in  part  because  it  has  not  entered  most  economists'  theoretical  and 
econometric models, so that new generations of advisers arrive at central banks – each generation has a 
life of high influence of only perhaps five years.  
Even  where  central  bankers  choosing  a  managed  float  decide  on  intervention,  there  has  been  little 
systematic learning on whether announcing the intervention reduces the needed size of intervention and 
increases its likelihood of success, or has the reverse effect of engendering dangerous and unmanageable Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  51 
speculative moves.  The evidence from academic research remains mixed, but tilted to announcing.  On 
the part of some central banks, including the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, the 
trend is to announced, eg Beine and Lecourt (2006). 
But this conclusion, that announced foreign exchange rate interventions are faster and stronger and more 
reliable than domestic base operations in their impact on the exchange rate, can be interpreted as having a 
large element of country and time period specificity.  This can especially be the case if the operations on 
the  domestic  money  supply  are  heralded  as  being  taken  without  any  regard  to  their  exchange  rate 
implications.  With such a conjunction, the old-style undifferentiated attention to the monetary base is for 
instance  a  feasible  interpretation  of  the  exchange  rate  impact  for  Australia  at  the  end  of  1982,  the 
beginning of 1983, as follows.   
Less than a year after floating, Australia prior to an election in the normal electoral fashion, expanded the 
base, lowering the domestic interest rate immediately but not causing any immediate increase in inflation.  
Movers on foreign exchange markets asked is this serious, not about to be reversed tomorrow now that 
the country has moved this year to a float?  The Treasurer stated that it will hold, and the exchange rate 
promptly  depreciated  25%  on  a  trade-weighted  basis.    The  country’s  risk  premium  jumped 
correspondingly.   
Some took this as a lesson that Australia ought abandon its clean float policy that could accommodate 
short term monetary expansions without jeoparidsing its inflation target, and move to a managed float 
with the exchange rate itself a goal in its own right.  Others found no connection of concern or damage 
between the country’s monetary policy and its exchange rate collapse.  Eg the treasurer expressed his 
pride in the country’s new found monetary independence, the prime minister anticipated massive jobs 
increases from the fortuitous depreciation, and the Treasury employed a quarterly longer term interest rate 
series in which it detected no jump in the country’s risk premium, Pope (1987).  A few years later, the 
exchange rate entered the central bank’s goal, ie the float became officially managed, but since it has 
exited, ie the float is again officially clean.  Should this be classified as: 
1  switches in the confusion of floats, or 
2  learning followed by unlearning in reverting to a cleaner float, or 
3  unlearning followed by learning in returning to the cleaner float? 
Finally, suppose that we managed to find a pair of countries that for the requisite eras alternated with both 
having clean then both managed of vice versa and both had identical understandings of how to operate 
their regimes, could we then empirically estimate that effect?  The answer is major qualifications.  We 
would then need to consider the matter of other exchange rates impacting on that pair of currencies.  But 
there are so many of these that we use up all our degrees of freedom including them, leaving none over 
for empirical estimation unless we make assumptions about which to omit.  On which to omit we are left 
to our own judgment since we lack robust models of exchange rate determination to guide us in this 
regard.  Indeed, the problem of third currencies is so tricky and so consumptive of tractability possibilities 
and  degrees  of  freedom,  that  few  enter  theoretical  or  empirical  studies.    In  these  respects  too,  the 
laboratory is attractive.  It keeps much about the exchange rate regime steady, and excludes entirely the 
impact of the galaxy of their country currencies.  It gives us a fresh insight to complement our empirical 
work on field data. Pope et al Managed Float or 1-World Currency    Tuesday, December 1, 2009  52 
 
Appendix 8 
PAYOFF CONVERSION FORMULAE 
The payoffs in the game itself were expressed for each role in Talers for each point one.  The conversion 
of Talers into Euros was monotonic but not proportional.  It varied such that each participant had an 
identical payoff if all played according to the incomplete game theoretic equilibrium, and was set as 
follows: 
 
For the government and the central bank 1 Taler for one point 
For the union representative, 19,6875 Taler for one point 
For the employer representative 50 Taler for one point 
For the firms, 250 Taler for one point 
 
The sum in Talers was then converted into EUROs by the following formula: 
 
Sum  in  Talers 
between 
Conversion into !  
0 and 60                  x  
60 and 100    60 + 0.5 (x – 60) 
100 and 200    80 + 0.3 (x – 100) 
200 and 300  110 + 0.2 (x – 200) 
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